This is an NA question.
The argument requires us to connect two concepts that both show up in the premises.
We start with the premise that the set of historical figures that we find most engaging have the following attributes: they are mostly without moral virtue but they are brave and they are courageous.
Then, we get a conclusion indicator, "thus.” Thus, moral virtue is not among the characteristics that we most admire. Does that follow? The premise is about historical figures that we find most engaging (no moral virtue) and the conclusion is about figures that we most admire (no moral virtue). The “no moral virtue” concept is already connected between the premise and the conclusion so no gaps there. But the other two attributes better have something to do with each other. Specifically, the figures that we find most engaging better be the ones that we most admire. That’s supplying a premise-to-conclusion bridge and it’s something we often see in NA (and SA) questions.
Here, it’s a bit more complicated because we actually have another premise, as introduced by the word “since.” The people whose lives we would most like to live are those whose characteristics we admire most. This premise does link up to the idea of “most admire” in the conclusion, yet it’s entirely missing the idea of “no moral virtue.” So both the first and the second premises have something to offer and yet each is lacking something as well.
With the second premise, the conceptual gap that we need to fill has moved. We no longer need to bridge the first premise, “most engaging,” to the conclusion because the second premise, “most like to live,” connects to the conclusion already. Now the gap is between the first and the second premise. What does “most engaging” have to do with “most like to live”? There’s the new gap.
That is what Correct Answer Choice (A) provides. (A) says the historical figures that we find most engaging are the ones whose lives we would most like to live. That’s the premise-to-premise bridge that we need. And this bridge is required. Imagine if we didn't have it. It's not true that the historical figures who we find most engaging are the ones whose lives we would most like to live. If that were the case, then the first premise is severed from the conclusion. It has no way to support the conclusion anymore. The second premise cannot support the conclusion on its own since it says nothing about virtue. The argument thus falls apart.
Answer Choice (B) says bravery and creativity are characteristics that make it more difficult to be morally virtuous. That’s a claim about a causal relationship. We don't need to assume it. In fact, we don't need to assume any causal relationship between bravery and lack of virtue or creativity and lack of virtue.
Imagine if we negated this. Bravery and creativity don't make it harder to be morally virtuous. What would that mean? That would mean either they make it easier to be morally virtuous or they have no impact on moral virtuousness. Either way is fine for the argument.
Answer Choice (C) says historical figures are very rarely morally virtuous. This is not required. The argument is not concerned with the entire set of historical figures. Rather, it’s only concerned with a subset of the historical figures whom we find most engaging. What (C) has to say about the larger superset doesn’t matter because it doesn’t change the characteristics of the subset. The most engaging historical figures are still mostly not morally virtuous, yet are brave and creative.
Answer Choice (D) says people develop their conception of what makes an individual admirable based on what they know about historical figures. Interesting. This is not required. This has nothing to do with the argument. According to (D), you and I (people) develop our conception of what makes a person admirable based on what we know about historical figures. Like who? Maybe Genghis Khan, maybe Jesus, maybe whoever.
But who cares? I'm sure this is partially true as a description of my psychology. But that’s where (D) lives. It doesn’t live in the space of bridging the argument’s first premise to its second premise.
Answer Choice (E) says moral virtue is the characteristic of historical figures that we find least engaging. No, we don't need to assume that. Just like how we didn’t care about (B)’s claim about the causal relationship between bravery and moral virtue, we don't care about (E)’s claim about the ranking of what attributes of historical figures we find most and least engaging. (E) says that whatever the reason is that you find historical figures engaging, whether it's their bravery or creativity or whatever it is, virtue ranks at the bottom. And that has to be true. No, that doesn't have to be true. In fact, it's demonstrably false because the argument already conceded, at least for a minority of the historical figures we find the most engaging, that they are morally virtuous. Why do we find Martin Luther King to be engaging? I mean, he had a sexy voice so I get why he was so popular with the ladies, but surely moral virtue does not rank last on that list.
This is a Parallel Method of Reasoning question.
The argument uses causal reasoning. Specifically, when there are multiple sufficient causes, none of them are individually necessary.
The test writers made this harder to see because the stimulus tries to obscure this reasoning whereas (A) is much more direct.
The argument opens with contextual information: a practice. To achieve the traditional hotness of Mexican cuisine or Thai cuisine, cooks are particular about using jalapeno peppers or Thai chilis.
The word "but” signals a transition to a critique of that practice. But, as experienced cooks know, if food is sufficiently spiced, it is impossible to distinguish which ingredient is causing the hot sensation.
It might have occurred to you that “traditional hotness of spicy cuisines” may not fall within the range of “sufficiently spiced” food. If it did, that’s good. Were this a Weaken or an NA question, this conceptual gap might have formed the basis of the correct answer.
But this is a Parallel Method of Reasoning question. As such, we must understand the reasoning underlying the argument. In order to do that, we must interpret this argument as a response to what cooks do. That means we charitably assume that “traditional hotness of spicy cuisines” does fall within the range of “sufficiently spiced” food because otherwise, the argument would already be irrelevant.
That’s one hurdle, recognizing that in this instance, we concede an assumption so that we can proceed with interpreting the argument. Another way to think about this is that the context constrains our interpretation of the argument.
Moving on, the premise says that once food is sufficiently spiced, then we can't tell which ingredient caused the sensation (spiciness). That means with the Mexican chef using jalapeno to cook the traditional Mexican cuisine and the Thai chef using the Thai chili pepper to cook the traditional spicy Thai cuisine, as soon as both of their dishes reach the “sufficiently spiced” threshold, we can no longer tell whether it was the jalapeno or the Thai chili that caused the spiciness.
The argument concludes that none of the hot spices traditionally used are irreplaceable. In other words, any of them could be replaced. So the Thai chef didn’t have to use Thai chili. He could have used jalapeno instead.
You might be thinking, wait, that can’t be right. Surely there must be other differences between Thai chili and jalapeno. Now you’ve encountered the second hurdle. You’re probably right about other differences in aroma or flavor, differences that have nothing to do with spiciness. And I’m sure those are the differences that explain why Thai cuisine uses Thai chili and not just any random pepper. But again, we must interpret this conclusion in context. In context, “replaceable” doesn’t mean “replaceable without any difference to the outcome.” Rather, it means “replaceable without any difference to the outcome in spiciness.” That latter interpretation greatly improves the strength of the argument. Under that latter interpretation, the conclusion follows more strongly from the premise.
But the test writers are banking on us to not take context into consideration. If we don’t, then we think this conclusion is highly problematic. And if we think that, then we’ll likely overlook Correct Answer Choice (A).
I think once we get past those two hurdles, this argument feels quite strong. More than that, the reasoning also becomes much more apparent. The reasoning is that because there are multiple causes (e.g., jalapeno, Thai chili, etc.) of a phenomenon (spiciness), then none of them is necessary to give rise to that phenomenon.
Correct Answer Choice (A) contains the same causal reasoning in a direct argument. It doesn’t give us contextual information to constrain our interpretation of the argument.
It is light-sensitive pigment in the fishes' eyes that makes it possible for them to see. That’s cause-effect. Any one of a variety of pigments makes underwater vision possible. So pigment variant A, pigment variant B, pigment variant C, any one of them makes underwater vision possible. Therefore, no particular variant is necessary for underwater vision.
The analogy is strong. Pigment variant A analogizes to Thai chili. Pigment variant B analogizes to jalapeno. Underwater vision analogizes to a certain level of spiciness. Any one of the causes can result in the effect, and therefore none of them is necessary.
One point of disanalogy is that underwater vision is binary (as presented in (A)) whereas spiciness is on a spectrum. But the argument mitigated that by treating spiciness as if it were binary by laying down a cutoff, a threshold.
Answer Choice (B) contains a circular sub-argument where the premise and the conclusion are restatements of each other.
No country that devotes the majority of its resources to the military can avoid war. Therefore, peacetime cannot persist in any nation that uses over half its resources to support its armed forces. These claims are more or less equivalent.
Answer Choice (C) says to receive a doctorate, a student must complete the required number of classes and write a dissertation. We can already move on. The reasoning in the stimulus is causal. The reasoning in (C) is conditional; it’s talking about a sufficiency-necessity relationship.
To get a PhD, you must complete the required number of classes, and you must write your dissertation. (C) continues to commit the sufficiency-necessity confusion flaw. It concludes the sufficient condition on the basis of premises that satisfy the necessary condition.
Answer Choice (D) says attending a music concert is a far richer experience than listening to a recorded piece of music. Why? Well, when playing music live, musicians depart from the original score; therefore, each live concert is a unique and irreplaceable event.
(D) implies that this “unique and irreplaceable” feature of live music is not to be found in recorded music. Well, yes. The whole point of recorded music is to be exactly the same each time you play it.
(D) assumes “unique and irreplaceable” is more valuable than its absence. On the back of that assumed value judgment, it makes its conclusion that a music concert is a “far richer experience.”
This mode of reasoning has no resemblance to the argument in the stimulus.
But on its own terms, (D) is not a strong argument precisely because of the assumed value judgment. It’s not self-evident that “unique and irreplaceable” is the “richer experience.” Reasonable people may well disagree. They may well have other values that matter more to creating a richer experience, and those other values might be better served by recorded music.
Answer Choice (E) is a cookie-cutter trap answer in Parallel Method of Reasoning questions. It talks about cooking and ingredients. The reason why this trap is here is because the test writers are thinking to themselves, “Hey, you know what? I bet if students haven't done many of these kinds of questions, they'll just see this phrase 'most similar' and they'll conflate 'most similar in reasoning' with 'most similar in subject matter.'”
Reasoning is very different from subject matter. Two arguments about very different subjects can nonetheless be very similar in reasoning, as evidenced by the argument in the stimulus and the argument in (A). And two arguments about very similar subjects can nonetheless be very different in reasoning, as evidenced by the argument in the stimulus and the argument in (E).
(E) says that good cooks always select their ingredients carefully, for they know that every delicious meal is made with high-quality ingredients. Therefore, no meal made without high-quality ingredients is delicious. Wait, that’s circular reasoning again. If every delicious meal is made with high-quality ingredients, then, of course, meals without high-quality ingredients are not delicious.
This is an NA question.
Sometimes, when the structure of the argument is very simple, NA answers turn out to also be SA answers. Here, the question stem says “properly drawn,” which hints that the answer might also be an SA answer.
The stimulus begins with OPA. Health experts who advocate moderate consumption of alcohol for its cardiac benefits say that red wine is the most beneficial. Next, we get "but" and “while.” Both indicate transition. “While” indicates a transition to a concession point. The author concedes that there is statistical evidence that people who drink moderate amounts of red wine are less likely to fall victim to heart disease than are people who drink moderate amounts of other alcoholic beverages. So that’s her concession to OPA on red wine’s benefit.
Now we get back to the “but.” What the author really wants to say is that the proponents of red wine have yet to determine what biochemical mechanism, if any, explains this difference. So, the author concludes, their evidence is inconclusive.
Okay, that’s a very simple argument. One premise, one conclusion. Why is the OP’s evidence inconclusive? Because OP have not determined a biochemical mechanism.
Well, we’ve seen this kind of NA question before. We need a P to C bridge. We need to connect the idea in the premise to the idea in the conclusion.
And that’s what Correct Answer Choice (D) does. (D) says that evidence regarding the health benefits of foods or drinks must be corroborated by accurate accounts of the mechanisms involved in order to be conclusive. Great, just what we needed. For evidence to be conclusive, there must be an accurate account of the mechanisms involved. The premise fails the necessary condition (OP gave no account at all of the mechanism). Therefore, contrapose and we can conclude that OP’s evidence is not conclusive.
This is a classic NA question where the correct answer builds a P to C bridge. If this were a PSA question or SA question, (D) would still be the correct answer. That’s not always the case, but sometimes the correct answer in an NA question overlaps with the correct answer in a PSA or SA question.
Answer Choice (A) says if a substance has health benefits when consumed in moderation, then physicians should advocate moderate consumption even if excess consumption is harmful. The argument is not about what physicians should or shouldn't advocate. We’re not talking about what physicians ought to do. We're talking about whether there is enough evidence that red wine consumption is beneficial.
Answer Choice (C) suffers from the same issue. Physicians should not make any recommendations regarding something… We don't care.
The author is not writing an op-ed telling people to drink more or less red wine. Rather, the author is making an argument about whether the people who are claiming that red wine is the most beneficial of alcohols for heart health benefits (OP) have a good argument. And she's saying that they don't.
If (C) isn’t necessary, does it connect at all to the argument? If we take our author's conclusion to be true, that is, evidence is inconclusive about whether red wine is healthy, and if we take (C) to be true, then we can infer that physicians shouldn't make any recommendations.
Answer Choice (B) says assertions regarding the health benefits of foods or drinks should be supported by persuasive statistical evidence. Not necessary. The argument isn’t concerned about statistical evidence. The author already conceded that there is some statistical evidence in support of OPA.
If (B) is negated, the author’s argument still stands as long as (D) is true.
Answer Choice (E) says one should try to find a causal mechanism for the health benefits of red wine only if the health benefits have been conclusively demonstrated. This a mishmash of the words and concepts that we might expect to find in the correct answer choice. The argument just assumes that if you don't have a causal mechanism, then you don't have conclusive evidence. That's it. (E) is trying to mimic those concepts and relationships. (E) is saying if health benefits haven’t been conclusively demonstrated, then you shouldn’t try to find a causal mechanism for those as-of-yet-undemonstrated health benefits. I get the feeling that (E) is worried about wasting time and that’s why (E) is admonishing against prematurely rushing to find a causal mechanism. (E) is saying first make sure that the health benefits have been conclusively demonstrated.
This is an NA question.
The question tests reasoning about sets and intersections between sets.
The argument tells us that while the audience for part one of a documentary TV series was small, the audience for part two was not that much smaller. Thus, most of the viewers who watched the program the first night (the “small” set) liked it enough to tune in again the next night.
Wait, what? How do we know this? All we know is that on the first night, a small set of people watched part one and that on the second night, a smaller (but not by much) set of people watched part two. That doesn’t imply there has to be significant overlap in the two sets.
So that’s a huge gap we need to fill. How we fill the gap depends on what the answers give us because filling the gap in a necessary assumption manner can generate a very weak statement. That’s what Correct Answer Choice (A) does. It says most viewers who tuned in to the program on the second night had also watched the first night. Because the second night is the smaller set, at least half of that set must overlap with the first (larger) night set. Otherwise, there’s no way that more than half of the first (larger) night set can find itself within the second night set. That’s stating the issue in abstract terms, in terms of sets and intersections. The advantage of abstracting is to help you recognize patterns. Other questions will (and have) manifest(ed) the same issue.
In concrete terms, imagine you have 100 people in the first (larger) night set and 80 people in the second (smaller) night set. (A) claims that at least 41 from the second night set must have come from the first night set. That must be true. Imagine if it were false. If only 40 (of the 80) came from the first night set, then that means 60 (of the 100) from the first night set did not watch on the second night. That contradicts the conclusion.
Note that just because (A) is true, that doesn’t guarantee that the conclusion is true. It’s still possible for the conclusion to be false. But that doesn’t matter since this is an NA question and not an SA question. We need (A) as an NA because its truth is what makes it possible for (as opposed to guarantees) the conclusion to follow.
Answer Choice (B) says most of the viewers who tuned in to the program the second night liked it. This is not necessary. We don't care about the second-night viewers' enjoyment of the program. Even if every single viewer who tuned in on the second night hated it, the argument can still follow. It’s still possible that more than half of the first-night viewers tuned in on the second night. (B) would simply mean that they probably regretted that decision.
Answer Choice (C) says most of the viewers who watched the program both nights enjoyed the first night more than the second night. This is not necessary. We do not need to compare how much the viewers enjoyed the program on the first versus the second nights. Whether they liked the first night more than the second has no bearing on the argument.
Answer Choice (D) says many of the viewers who tuned in to the program the first night but not the second night were unable to watch the program on the second night. This is not necessary. The argument would be just fine even if all of the first-night-only viewers were able to (but chose not to) watch on the second night. (D) is about why some people are first-night-only viewers. (D) says it’s because they were unable to watch the second night (maybe scheduling conflict, or their power went out, or whatever). But the argument doesn’t care.
Answer Choice (E) says many of the viewers who watched the program on the first night were people who generally like to watch TV documentaries. This is not necessary. We already know that the first-night people watched this documentary regardless of whether they generally like documentaries.
This is a Parallel Flawed Method of Reasoning question.
The argument makes the oldest mistake in the book: sufficiency-necessity confusion.
The argument lays out a rule: if no high school diploma and no demonstrated competence, then no license.
/hs and /dc → /license
The argument then applies this rule to Marie but makes a logical mistake in doing so.
Marie has both a high school diploma and a demonstrated competence. That means she has failed the sufficient condition of the rule. That means the rule goes away. We cannot draw a conclusion about whether Marie will be licensed.
Yet that’s just what the argument does. It concludes that Marie will be licensed.
/hs and /dc → /license
hsmarie and dcmarie
________
licensemarie
That’s the sufficiency-necessity confusion.
Answer Choice (A) says without having either an excellent ear or exceptional manual dexterity, a person cannot play the piano well. "Without" is group 3, negate sufficient.
If no excellent ear and no manual dexterity, then no play piano well.
If (A) wants to be the correct answer, it just has to apply this general rule to Paul in the same sufficiency-necessity confused way that the rule was applied to Marie. (A) needs to show that Paul has an excellent ear and he has manual dexterity. Then (A) needs to conclude that Paul plays the piano well.
But (A) doesn’t do that and so (A) is wrong.
Instead, (A) has Paul fail the necessary condition by showing that he plays the piano well. That means Paul must have either an excellent ear or exceptional manual dexterity. That would be a valid conclusion. Yet (A) invalidly concludes that he must have both an excellent ear and exceptional manual dexterity.
Correct Answer Choice (B) says it's not possible to be an effective foreign language teacher without being fluent in at least two languages. "Without" is group 3, negate sufficient.
If not fluent in at least two languages, then not effective.
Already we encounter a trick. (B) tries to hide itself. We’re expecting a conjunctive sufficient condition, yet (B) gives us just a single sufficient condition. (B) is hoping that we would just move on.
But (B) is the correct answer, and it's correct because it commits the same sufficiency-necessity flaw.
Take this general rule and apply it to Professor Y. It says that Professor Y is fluent in Greek, English, and Persian. So Professor Y is fluent in at least two languages. She fails the sufficient condition just like Marie failed her sufficient condition. (B) just needs to invalidly conclude that Professor Y will be effective in order to be the correct answer choice. That’s exactly what (B) does.
/at-least-2 → /effective
at-least-2prof-y
________
effectiveprof-y
Answer Choice (C) says a person cannot be a licensed plumbing contractor without having completed an apprenticeship. "Without" is group 3, negate sufficient.
If licensed plumbing contractor, then completed apprenticeship.
Take this rule and apply it to Martin. Martin is a licensed plumber. I'm assuming that to mean the same thing as licensed plumbing contractor. Therefore, Martin completed his apprenticeship. This is valid.
Answer Choice (D) says no one can be an effective mayor of a major industrial seaport without a thorough knowledge of both national and international affairs. “Without" is group 3, negate sufficient.
If effective mayor of a major industrial seaport, then have thorough knowledge of national and international affairs.
Take this rule and apply it to Mayor L. Mayor L is an effective mayor. Does that trigger the sufficient condition? No, because we don’t know if Mayor L is an effective mayor of a major industrial seaport.
Okay, so (D) assumes that being an effective mayor is the same thing as being an effective mayor of a major industrial seaport. That’s not a reasonable assumption but it’s also not a sufficiency-necessity error. If we patch up that assumption, then (D) is valid. (D)’s conclusion would follow.
Answer Choice (E) says the only way to make a delicious vegetable soup is to use fresh vegetables. "The only" is group 1.
If delicious vegetable soup, then used fresh vegetables.
This particular vegetable soup is delicious, which means it satisfies the sufficient condition. That means (E) can validly draw the necessary condition as the conclusion. That’s exactly what (E) does.
The author points out that Klemke’s argument is flawed, because bias against Klemke doesn’t prevent someone from having legitimate complaints about Klemke’s services. Based on the fact Klemke’s argument is flawed, the author concludes that the complaints against Klemke are not unfounded.
A
takes a consequence of someone’s being biased to be a cause of the bias
B
concludes that a claim is false on the grounds that an inadequate argument has been given for it
C
rejects an argument on the grounds that the person who offered the argument is biased
D
relies on a sample of opinions that is unlikely to represent diverse political outlooks
E
overlooks the possibility that people whose views diverge are unaware of their disagreement
This is a Flaw/Descriptive Weakening question.
The argument opens with OPA. Mr. Klemke argues that the complaints made against his company are unfounded. That’s his conclusion (OPC). His premises (OPP) are that the complainants are biased because they disagree with his political views.
Let’s pause there and analyze OPA. Is the reasoning strong? No. It’s a classic source attack. And that’s exactly what the author recognizes and calls out in her next sentence. She says that the complainants can be mistreated by Mr. Klemke’s company regardless of their political views. That’s true. That’s why Mr. Klemke’s argument is flawed.
The author, however, proceeds to draw her own flawed conclusion. She should have simply concluded that “Mr. Klemke has failed to prove that the complaints are unfounded.” That means we don’t know if the complaints are founded or unfounded. We only know that Mr. Klemke failed to make a case for their being unfounded.
What did she actually conclude? That “the complaints are not unfounded.” That means the complaints are substantiated. But they haven’t been substantiated. There’s no evidence at all that pertains to whether these complaints are true or false.
This is a classic flaw that conflates weakening an argument with proving the conclusion of said argument to be false. Weakening an argument erodes the support between the premise and the conclusion. It is engaged at an abstract level with the argument. If you want to show that the statement in the conclusion is false, then you have to descend to the ground level of what the argument is talking about: whose house and what roof and what date was the service provided and what went wrong, etc. You’d have to bring facts (premises) to bear on those issues if you want to prove the complaints are founded or unfounded. That’s very different from the premises the author actually offers which lives one level above these issues.
This is what Correct Answer Choice (B) points out. It says that the argument concludes that a claim (the complaints are unfounded) is false (they’re not unfounded) on the grounds that an inadequate argument has been given for it (Mr. Klemke’s source attack argument is inadequate).
Answer Choice (A) says that the argument takes a consequence of someone’s being biased to be a cause of the bias. (A) charged the argument with confusing cause and effect. But the argument doesn’t do that. What is “a consequence of someone’s being biased”? According to Mr. Klemke, it causes the person to lodge false accusations at his company. According to the author, nothing. What is “a cause of the bias”? According to Mr. Klemke, having political views different from his own. According to the author, nothing. So according to (A), the argument, that is, the author’s argument confused nothing with nothing. Even if we take (A) to be describing Mr. Klemke’s argument, which we shouldn’t because that’s not the argument in question, but just as an exercise, even if we do, (A) is still descriptively inaccurate. Mr. Klemke didn’t confuse a person lodging false accusations at his company with a person having political views.
Answer Choice (C) says that the argument rejects an argument on the grounds that the person who offered the argument (Mr. Klemke) is baised. (C) fails to accurately describe both the premise and the conclusion. The author never claimed that Mr. Klemke is biased. Mr. Klemke accused someone else of being biased. So the premise descriptor is false. The conclusion should have rejected an argument because that would have been the right move. But, as we discussed, it actually rejected Mr. Klemke’s conclusion. So the conclusion descriptor is false as well.
Answer Choice (D) says that the argument relies on a sample of opinions (false, the author’s premise does not rely on a sample of opinions) that is unlikely to represent diverse political outlooks.
Answer Choice (E) says that the argument overlooks the possibility that people whose views diverge are unaware of their disagreement. It’s unclear whether the argument overlooks this but it doesn’t matter because this has nothing to do with why the argument is flawed. Mr. Klemke is a person whose (political) views are different from his dissatisfied customers. Mr. Klemke is clearly aware of this divergence in views. It’s unclear whether his customers are aware.
Energy is a theoretical construct.
Since the theory of relativity says there’s no essential distinction between energy and mass, mass is also a theoretical construct.
All physical objects are made purely of mass and energy.
A
It fails to consider whether anything other than physical objects may be composed purely of mass and energy.
B
It overlooks the possibility that something may lack a feature even if it is composed purely of things that have that feature.
C
It presumes, without providing justification, that two things may have different features even if there is no essential distinction between them.
D
It fails to address adequately the possibility that a feature of some theoretical constructs need not be shared by every theoretical construct.
E
It presumes, without providing justification, that the fact that a suggestion has been made by a physicist proves the truth of that suggestion.
This is a Flaw/Descriptive Weakening question.
The stimulus starts with a claim from many prominent physicists. So that’s OPP. They claim that energy is merely a theoretical construct. Next, the author gives a premise, that the theory of relativity tells us that there is no essential distinction between energy and mass, and draws an intermediate conclusion, that mass must also be a theoretical construct.
First, note that the author uses OPP to further her own argument. This is uncommon. Usually, when OPP is present, the author challenges it.
Next, let’s examine the reasoning in this sub-argument before moving on to the main argument. How strong is the support? Well, the two premises both rely on authority to establish the truth of their claims. The first premise relies upon the authority of “many prominent physicists.” The second premise relies upon the authority of the theory of relativity. When it comes to appeals to authority, the key question to ask is if the appeal is to relevant authority. If it isn’t, then that’s a flaw. Here, the appeals are to relevant authority. First to “many prominent physicists” on what energy is and second to the “theory of relativity” on the relationship between mass and energy. Does that mean the sub-conclusion is validly drawn? No. Arguments that rely on appeals to relevant authority are never valid. But they can be reasonable. This sub-conclusion, mass is a theoretical construct, is reasonable. We can weaken the argument and we can strengthen the argument.
The main argument proceeds to use this sub-conclusion as a major premise. It also supplies another major premise, that all physical objects are composed purely of mass and energy. From those two premises, the conclusion is drawn that physical objects must also be theoretical constructs.
Now let’s examine the reasoning in this main argument. Do you recognize the pattern? It’s a part-to-whole argument. One premise states that mass (and energy) has a certain characteristic (being a theoretical construct). Another premise states that physical objects (whole) are composed purely of mass and energy (parts). The conclusion attributes the characteristic of the parts to the whole.
This is what Correct Answer Choice (B) points out. It says that the argument overlooks the possibility that something (a physical object, the “whole”) may lack a feature (being a theoretical construct) even if it (a physical object) is composed purely of things (mass and energy, the “parts”) that have that feature (being a theoretical construct). That’s exactly right.
Answer Choice (A) says the argument fails to consider whether anything other than physical objects may be composed purely of mass and energy. That’s true, the argument didn’t consider this. Do mass and energy together make up other, non-physical object things? But, wait, it doesn’t matter. Whether the answer is yes or no has no bearing on why the argument is vulnerable to criticism.
Answer Choice (C) says the argument presumes without justification that two things may have different features even if there’s no essential distinction between them. But that’s descriptively inaccurate. The argument actually presumes the opposite. It presumes that two things (mass and energy) cannot have different features if there’s no essential distinction between them. That’s how it drew the intermediate conclusion that mass is also a theoretical construct.
Answer Choice (D) says that the argument fails to adequately address the possibility that features of some theoretical construct need not be shared by every theoretical construct. The argument didn’t address this but it didn’t need to. (D) thinks “theoretical construct” has a “feature,” but in the argument, “theoretical construct” is itself the “feature.” In the argument, “theoretical construct” is the feature of energy and it’s also the feature of mass. We can map (D)’s “theoretical features” onto “mass” and “energy” in the argument, but then we’d have nothing to map (D)’s “features” onto.
Answer Choice (E) says the argument presumes, without providing justification, that the fact that a suggestion has been made by a physicist proves the truth of that suggestion. This is the most attractive wrong answer. (E) targets the reasoning in the sub-argument. Specifically, (E) recognizes that the reasoning there relied on an appeal to authority. This is good. But where (E) missteps is in failing to recognize that the appeal is to (many) relevant authorities. (E) thinks the argument “presumes, without providing justification” that just because “a physicist” made a suggestion, the suggestion is true. But in reality, the argument “presumes, with justification” that because “many prominent physicists” made a suggestion, the suggestion is true. The former would be a glaring vulnerability. The latter, while not ironclad, is much less of a vulnerability. The former is not equivalent to the latter, and therefore (E) is descriptively inaccurate.
This is an NA question.
The editorial begins with a premise that last year, many polls found that most people in the country say that they’re tired of celebrity gossip on TV news and that they’re not willing to watch them anymore. But last year’s ratings for TV news soared.
Okay, so something’s not quite adding up. But what is it? At this point in the stimulus, it resembles an RRE, doesn’t it? What’s going on? How can both of these claims be true?
Well, the editorial thinks (concludes) that often people portray themselves as they wish to be perceived, rather than as they actually are, whether or not they’re aware of it.
That could be the explanation. But in order for that to be the explanation, the argument must assume at least two things.
First, we know that somebody's watching those shows otherwise the ratings couldn’t have soared. And it’s a lot of somebodies. In order for the conclusion to follow, we have to assume that at least some of those same people who responded to the polls saying they’re sick of the shows and don’t want to watch them anymore ended up watching anyway. There must be at least some overlap between the set of people who say they don’t want to watch and the set of people who watched. If there’s no overlap, then that means everyone who ended up watching either didn’t respond to the polls or responded to the polls saying they wanted to watch. If that’s the case, then the conclusion cannot be supported on these premises. The argument falls apart.
But even with this first assumption, the conclusion still doesn’t yet follow. What does follow is that often people say one thing and do another. In other words, people are often hypocritical. But that’s not what the actual conclusion says. The actual conclusion says that people often “portray themselves as they wish to be perceived.” Where did that come from? Is being sick of those shows how they “wish to be perceived” or were they simply answering the poll questions without regard to how they “wish to be perceived”? If I tell you I don’t like ice cream, you can’t automatically assume that I wish to be perceived as someone who doesn’t like ice cream. Perhaps I’m just telling you that I don’t like ice cream and the thought never occurred to me that it would make me look bad. Seriously, what kind of degenerate doesn’t like ice cream? That’s the second assumption. At least some people who told the polls that they’re sick of the shows and don’t want to watch them anymore wish to be perceived as being sick of the shows and not wanting to watch anymore.
These two assumptions show up in Answer Choice (B) and Correct Answer Choice (E).
(B) goes after the first assumption and says that last year, “almost everyone” who said they’re sick of the shows and unwilling to watch anymore continued to watch. This is really helpful for the argument. But it’s not necessary. We don’t need “almost everyone.” We just need “some” people. Think about what “almost everyone” means. Yeah, it’s ambiguous but that doesn’t mean it has no obviously right and wrong interpretations. 95% would obviously be “almost everyone” and 60% would obviously not be “almost everyone.” But if it is in fact the case that 60% of those who said they’re sick of the shows yet watched anyway, then it's still really good for the argument. It’s not as good as 95% but it’s still good. That demonstrates (B) as unnecessary.
(E) goes after the second assumption and says that last year, “at least some” people who responded to the polls wished to be perceived as unwilling to watch the shows. That’s exactly right. If this were false, then that means nobody who responded to the polls wished to be perceived as unwilling to watch the shows. That would render the conclusion unsupportable on the basis of the premises.
Answer Choice (A) can be eliminated because of “everyone.” That’s even more unnecessary than “almost everyone” in (B). There’s another problem. (A) is trying to say that there must be an overlap between people who said they’re sick of the shows and people who said they’re unwilling to watch the shows. That’s not necessary. What we actually need is an overlap between either of those two sets with the set of people who in fact watched the shows.
Answer Choice (C) says “at least some,” which is good. The rest of it is not. (C) says at least some people who responded to the polls don’t believe that in their responses they’re portraying themselves as they actually were. In other words, some people were intentionally misrepresenting themselves through their response. Do we need that to be true? No. It’s fine if no one intentionally misrepresented themselves. They still could have unintentionally misrepresented themselves. The conclusion accommodated this already when it said “whether or not they’re aware of it.”
Answer Choice (D) says “no one” who responded to the polls portrayed themselves as they actually were. So everyone misrepresented themselves, whether they meant to or not. We don’t need this either. The argument doesn’t care if half of the people misrepresented themselves.
A
A being cannot acquire a skill without the help of others.
B
Skills are acquired only if they are needed.
C
The best way to learn how to acquire something is to be deprived of it.
D
A being with practical intelligence would get what it wants entirely through the use of its practical intelligence.
E
If a being were always deprived of what it wanted, it could not acquire practical intelligence.
This is an SA question.
The stimulus begins a premise that defines “practical intelligence” as “the ability to discover means to ends.” Next, another premise places “practical intelligence” as a member in the set of “skills” and “skills” do not develop on their own.
Now we get a conditional conclusion. If there’s a being that was never deprived of anything and was always and immediately given what it wanted, then that being could never possess “practical intelligence.”
Clearly, there’s a missing link. What is it?
This argument doesn’t translate neatly into conditional logic. But at a high level, you know the conclusion is arguing for this being not having practical intelligence. On the basis of what? On the basis of what this being is and on the basis of what practical intelligence is. The premises tell us that practical intelligence is a skill, and more specifically, it’s a skill to discover means to ends. So that’s an opening. And all we know about the being is that it’s never deprived of anything and gets whatever it wants immediately. These two ideas already connect together. Together, it means that this being is never in need of practical intelligence. Why not? Because think about what practical intelligence is. It’s the ability to discover means to ends. But this being always and immediately gets whatever it wants. Therefore, it’s never in need of discovering means to ends. Does that mean it will never possess the ability to discover means to ends? In other words, is it true that if it doesn’t need practical intelligence, then it won’t have practical intelligence?
Correct Answer Choice (B) says it’s true. It says that skills are acquired only if they are needed. Contrapositive: if skills are not needed, then they are not acquired. Kick the idea of “skills” up into the domain. We know practical intelligence is a skill and so this rule applies to practical intelligence. If it’s not needed, then it won’t be acquired. The premises trigger the sufficient condition. Therefore, we can draw the necessary condition as the conclusion.
Answer Choice (A) is a conditional constructed using “without.” Translated, (A) says that acquiring a skill requires the help of others. But the problem here is that the premises don’t trigger the failure of the necessary condition. The premises don’t amount to other beings not helping this being. In fact, if we take seriously the claim that this being gets whatever it wants, then as soon as it wants others to help it, others will help it.
Answer Choice (C) talks about the best way to acquire practical intelligence. But that implies there are other ways. So at best, this precludes the being in the argument from the best way of acquiring practical intelligence. That doesn’t preclude all ways.
Answer Choice (D) talks about a being that is already practically intelligent and how it gets what it wants. We don’t care. We’re trying to make an argument that this being cannot be a being that is practically intelligent. Telling us about beings that are already practically intelligent doesn’t help.
Answer Choice (E) talks about a being that is always deprived of what it wants. At this point, we can eliminate this answer. The premises fail this sufficient condition. Our being is never deprived of what it wants. Failing the sufficient condition renders this rule irrelevant.