This is a Flaw/Descriptive Weakening question.
The stimulus starts with a claim from many prominent physicists. So that’s OPP. They claim that energy is merely a theoretical construct. Next, the author gives a premise, that the theory of relativity tells us that there is no essential distinction between energy and mass, and draws an intermediate conclusion, that mass must also be a theoretical construct.
First, note that the author uses OPP to further her own argument. This is uncommon. Usually, when OPP is present, the author challenges it.
Next, let’s examine the reasoning in this sub-argument before moving on to the main argument. How strong is the support? Well, the two premises both rely on authority to establish the truth of their claims. The first premise relies upon the authority of “many prominent physicists.” The second premise relies upon the authority of the theory of relativity. When it comes to appeals to authority, the key question to ask is if the appeal is to relevant authority. If it isn’t, then that’s a flaw. Here, the appeals are to relevant authority. First to “many prominent physicists” on what energy is and second to the “theory of relativity” on the relationship between mass and energy. Does that mean the sub-conclusion is validly drawn? No. Arguments that rely on appeals to relevant authority are never valid. But they can be reasonable. This sub-conclusion, mass is a theoretical construct, is reasonable. We can weaken the argument and we can strengthen the argument.
The main argument proceeds to use this sub-conclusion as a major premise. It also supplies another major premise, that all physical objects are composed purely of mass and energy. From those two premises, the conclusion is drawn that physical objects must also be theoretical constructs.
Now let’s examine the reasoning in this main argument. Do you recognize the pattern? It’s a part-to-whole argument. One premise states that mass (and energy) has a certain characteristic (being a theoretical construct). Another premise states that physical objects (whole) are composed purely of mass and energy (parts). The conclusion attributes the characteristic of the parts to the whole.
This is what Correct Answer Choice (B) points out. It says that the argument overlooks the possibility that something (a physical object, the “whole”) may lack a feature (being a theoretical construct) even if it (a physical object) is composed purely of things (mass and energy, the “parts”) that have that feature (being a theoretical construct). That’s exactly right.
Answer Choice (A) says the argument fails to consider whether anything other than physical objects may be composed purely of mass and energy. That’s true, the argument didn’t consider this. Do mass and energy together make up other, non-physical object things? But, wait, it doesn’t matter. Whether the answer is yes or no has no bearing on why the argument is vulnerable to criticism.
Answer Choice (C) says the argument presumes without justification that two things may have different features even if there’s no essential distinction between them. But that’s descriptively inaccurate. The argument actually presumes the opposite. It presumes that two things (mass and energy) cannot have different features if there’s no essential distinction between them. That’s how it drew the intermediate conclusion that mass is also a theoretical construct.
Answer Choice (D) says that the argument fails to adequately address the possibility that features of some theoretical construct need not be shared by every theoretical construct. The argument didn’t address this but it didn’t need to. (D) thinks “theoretical construct” has a “feature,” but in the argument, “theoretical construct” is itself the “feature.” In the argument, “theoretical construct” is the feature of energy and it’s also the feature of mass. We can map (D)’s “theoretical features” onto “mass” and “energy” in the argument, but then we’d have nothing to map (D)’s “features” onto.
Answer Choice (E) says the argument presumes, without providing justification, that the fact that a suggestion has been made by a physicist proves the truth of that suggestion. This is the most attractive wrong answer. (E) targets the reasoning in the sub-argument. Specifically, (E) recognizes that the reasoning there relied on an appeal to authority. This is good. But where (E) missteps is in failing to recognize that the appeal is to (many) relevant authorities. (E) thinks the argument “presumes, without providing justification” that just because “a physicist” made a suggestion, the suggestion is true. But in reality, the argument “presumes, with justification” that because “many prominent physicists” made a suggestion, the suggestion is true. The former would be a glaring vulnerability. The latter, while not ironclad, is much less of a vulnerability. The former is not equivalent to the latter, and therefore (E) is descriptively inaccurate.
Energy is a theoretical construct.
Since the theory of relativity says there’s no essential distinction between energy and mass, mass is also a theoretical construct.
All physical objects are made purely of mass and energy.
A
It fails to consider whether anything other than physical objects may be composed purely of mass and energy.
B
It overlooks the possibility that something may lack a feature even if it is composed purely of things that have that feature.
C
It presumes, without providing justification, that two things may have different features even if there is no essential distinction between them.
D
It fails to address adequately the possibility that a feature of some theoretical constructs need not be shared by every theoretical construct.
E
It presumes, without providing justification, that the fact that a suggestion has been made by a physicist proves the truth of that suggestion.
This is a Flaw/Descriptive Weakening question.
The stimulus starts with a claim from many prominent physicists. So that’s OPP. They claim that energy is merely a theoretical construct. Next, the author gives a premise, that the theory of relativity tells us that there is no essential distinction between energy and mass, and draws an intermediate conclusion, that mass must also be a theoretical construct.
First, note that the author uses OPP to further her own argument. This is uncommon. Usually, when OPP is present, the author challenges it.
Next, let’s examine the reasoning in this sub-argument before moving on to the main argument. How strong is the support? Well, the two premises both rely on authority to establish the truth of their claims. The first premise relies upon the authority of “many prominent physicists.” The second premise relies upon the authority of the theory of relativity. When it comes to appeals to authority, the key question to ask is if the appeal is to relevant authority. If it isn’t, then that’s a flaw. Here, the appeals are to relevant authority. First to “many prominent physicists” on what energy is and second to the “theory of relativity” on the relationship between mass and energy. Does that mean the sub-conclusion is validly drawn? No. Arguments that rely on appeals to relevant authority are never valid. But they can be reasonable. This sub-conclusion, mass is a theoretical construct, is reasonable. We can weaken the argument and we can strengthen the argument.
The main argument proceeds to use this sub-conclusion as a major premise. It also supplies another major premise, that all physical objects are composed purely of mass and energy. From those two premises, the conclusion is drawn that physical objects must also be theoretical constructs.
Now let’s examine the reasoning in this main argument. Do you recognize the pattern? It’s a part-to-whole argument. One premise states that mass (and energy) has a certain characteristic (being a theoretical construct). Another premise states that physical objects (whole) are composed purely of mass and energy (parts). The conclusion attributes the characteristic of the parts to the whole.
This is what Correct Answer Choice (B) points out. It says that the argument overlooks the possibility that something (a physical object, the “whole”) may lack a feature (being a theoretical construct) even if it (a physical object) is composed purely of things (mass and energy, the “parts”) that have that feature (being a theoretical construct). That’s exactly right.
Answer Choice (A) says the argument fails to consider whether anything other than physical objects may be composed purely of mass and energy. That’s true, the argument didn’t consider this. Do mass and energy together make up other, non-physical object things? But, wait, it doesn’t matter. Whether the answer is yes or no has no bearing on why the argument is vulnerable to criticism.
Answer Choice (C) says the argument presumes without justification that two things may have different features even if there’s no essential distinction between them. But that’s descriptively inaccurate. The argument actually presumes the opposite. It presumes that two things (mass and energy) cannot have different features if there’s no essential distinction between them. That’s how it drew the intermediate conclusion that mass is also a theoretical construct.
Answer Choice (D) says that the argument fails to adequately address the possibility that features of some theoretical construct need not be shared by every theoretical construct. The argument didn’t address this but it didn’t need to. (D) thinks “theoretical construct” has a “feature,” but in the argument, “theoretical construct” is itself the “feature.” In the argument, “theoretical construct” is the feature of energy and it’s also the feature of mass. We can map (D)’s “theoretical features” onto “mass” and “energy” in the argument, but then we’d have nothing to map (D)’s “features” onto.
Answer Choice (E) says the argument presumes, without providing justification, that the fact that a suggestion has been made by a physicist proves the truth of that suggestion. This is the most attractive wrong answer. (E) targets the reasoning in the sub-argument. Specifically, (E) recognizes that the reasoning there relied on an appeal to authority. This is good. But where (E) missteps is in failing to recognize that the appeal is to (many) relevant authorities. (E) thinks the argument “presumes, without providing justification” that just because “a physicist” made a suggestion, the suggestion is true. But in reality, the argument “presumes, with justification” that because “many prominent physicists” made a suggestion, the suggestion is true. The former would be a glaring vulnerability. The latter, while not ironclad, is much less of a vulnerability. The former is not equivalent to the latter, and therefore (E) is descriptively inaccurate.
This is a Method of Reasoning question.
We’re asked to describe Espinosa’s argument, how he responds to Jones. Jones speaks first. She argues that a budget deficit is good for the country’s finances because it discourages excessive government spending.
Espinosa responds. He says, “That’s like saying…” Okay, pause. At this point, we already know that he’s arguing by analogy. And that’s already enough to hunt out Correct Answer Choice (A). It’s the only one that describes Espinosa’s argument as an argument by analogy.
Okay, so what is it like? It’s like arguing that reaching the credit limit is good for your finances because it discourages excessive spending. He concedes that reaching the credit limit will likely discourage excessive spending. But reaching the credit limit is still a poor financial decision. That never should have happened in the first place. The same goes for the government, meaning the government never should have had a budget deficit to begin with.
(A) accurately describes Espinosa’s argument. His argument about reaching the credit limit is clearly fallacious. He uses that to show that Jones’s argument is analogously fallacious.
Answer Choice (B) says Espinosa demonstrates that Jones’s argument is circular. That it begs the question. That it presupposes what it sets out to prove. That’s not right. Jones’s argument isn’t circular. The premise and the conclusion are different claims. Espinosa doesn’t mistake Jones’s argument for a circular one. Here’s a circular argument that Jones could have made: A budget deficit is good for the country’s finances because spending in excess of revenues improves a nation’s financial situation.
Answer Choice (C) says Espinosa offers empirical evidence that undermines Jones’s conclusion. No, he doesn’t. Here’s what empirical evidence might look like: Back in 2010, France experienced a budget deficit which caused it to default on its treasury bond interest payments. That shattered international confidence in the French government, which resulted in a decade of economic decline. That’s empirical evidence that a budget deficit isn’t good for a country's finances.
Answer Choice (D) says Espinosa launched a source attack against Jones. Come on. Espinosa knows better than that. Whether Jones’s personal finances are managed well is irrelevant to Jones’s argument. Espinosa doesn’t go there.
Answer Choice (E) says Espinosa suggests that Jones overgeneralized. That’s not right. Jones’s argument didn’t overgeneralize. And Espinosa certainly didn’t claim that it did. Here’s what Jones might have argued that would have been an overgeneralization: Back in 2010, France experienced a budget deficit which caused it to impose austerity measures. Those policies resulted in a decade of economic boom that the country has never seen before. Therefore, a budget deficit is good for a country’s finances. Jones is a bit too eager. Just because it worked out for France doesn’t mean it’s generally good. That’s overgeneralization.
This is an NA question.
The editorial begins with a premise that last year, many polls found that most people in the country say that they’re tired of celebrity gossip on TV news and that they’re not willing to watch them anymore. But last year’s ratings for TV news soared.
Okay, so something’s not quite adding up. But what is it? At this point in the stimulus, it resembles an RRE, doesn’t it? What’s going on? How can both of these claims be true?
Well, the editorial thinks (concludes) that often people portray themselves as they wish to be perceived, rather than as they actually are, whether or not they’re aware of it.
That could be the explanation. But in order for that to be the explanation, the argument must assume at least two things.
First, we know that somebody's watching those shows otherwise the ratings couldn’t have soared. And it’s a lot of somebodies. In order for the conclusion to follow, we have to assume that at least some of those same people who responded to the polls saying they’re sick of the shows and don’t want to watch them anymore ended up watching anyway. There must be at least some overlap between the set of people who say they don’t want to watch and the set of people who watched. If there’s no overlap, then that means everyone who ended up watching either didn’t respond to the polls or responded to the polls saying they wanted to watch. If that’s the case, then the conclusion cannot be supported on these premises. The argument falls apart.
But even with this first assumption, the conclusion still doesn’t yet follow. What does follow is that often people say one thing and do another. In other words, people are often hypocritical. But that’s not what the actual conclusion says. The actual conclusion says that people often “portray themselves as they wish to be perceived.” Where did that come from? Is being sick of those shows how they “wish to be perceived” or were they simply answering the poll questions without regard to how they “wish to be perceived”? If I tell you I don’t like ice cream, you can’t automatically assume that I wish to be perceived as someone who doesn’t like ice cream. Perhaps I’m just telling you that I don’t like ice cream and the thought never occurred to me that it would make me look bad. Seriously, what kind of degenerate doesn’t like ice cream? That’s the second assumption. At least some people who told the polls that they’re sick of the shows and don’t want to watch them anymore wish to be perceived as being sick of the shows and not wanting to watch anymore.
These two assumptions show up in Answer Choice (B) and Correct Answer Choice (E).
(B) goes after the first assumption and says that last year, “almost everyone” who said they’re sick of the shows and unwilling to watch anymore continued to watch. This is really helpful for the argument. But it’s not necessary. We don’t need “almost everyone.” We just need “some” people. Think about what “almost everyone” means. Yeah, it’s ambiguous but that doesn’t mean it has no obviously right and wrong interpretations. 95% would obviously be “almost everyone” and 60% would obviously not be “almost everyone.” But if it is in fact the case that 60% of those who said they’re sick of the shows yet watched anyway, then it's still really good for the argument. It’s not as good as 95% but it’s still good. That demonstrates (B) as unnecessary.
(E) goes after the second assumption and says that last year, “at least some” people who responded to the polls wished to be perceived as unwilling to watch the shows. That’s exactly right. If this were false, then that means nobody who responded to the polls wished to be perceived as unwilling to watch the shows. That would render the conclusion unsupportable on the basis of the premises.
Answer Choice (A) can be eliminated because of “everyone.” That’s even more unnecessary than “almost everyone” in (B). There’s another problem. (A) is trying to say that there must be an overlap between people who said they’re sick of the shows and people who said they’re unwilling to watch the shows. That’s not necessary. What we actually need is an overlap between either of those two sets with the set of people who in fact watched the shows.
Answer Choice (C) says “at least some,” which is good. The rest of it is not. (C) says at least some people who responded to the polls don’t believe that in their responses they’re portraying themselves as they actually were. In other words, some people were intentionally misrepresenting themselves through their response. Do we need that to be true? No. It’s fine if no one intentionally misrepresented themselves. They still could have unintentionally misrepresented themselves. The conclusion accommodated this already when it said “whether or not they’re aware of it.”
Answer Choice (D) says “no one” who responded to the polls portrayed themselves as they actually were. So everyone misrepresented themselves, whether they meant to or not. We don’t need this either. The argument doesn’t care if half of the people misrepresented themselves.
This is an NA question.
The editorial begins with a premise that last year, many polls found that most people in the country say that they’re tired of celebrity gossip on TV news and that they’re not willing to watch them anymore. But last year’s ratings for TV news soared.
Okay, so something’s not quite adding up. But what is it? At this point in the stimulus, it resembles an RRE, doesn’t it? What’s going on? How can both of these claims be true?
Well, the editorial thinks (concludes) that often people portray themselves as they wish to be perceived, rather than as they actually are, whether or not they’re aware of it.
That could be the explanation. But in order for that to be the explanation, the argument must assume at least two things.
First, we know that somebody's watching those shows otherwise the ratings couldn’t have soared. And it’s a lot of somebodies. In order for the conclusion to follow, we have to assume that at least some of those same people who responded to the polls saying they’re sick of the shows and don’t want to watch them anymore ended up watching anyway. There must be at least some overlap between the set of people who say they don’t want to watch and the set of people who watched. If there’s no overlap, then that means everyone who ended up watching either didn’t respond to the polls or responded to the polls saying they wanted to watch. If that’s the case, then the conclusion cannot be supported on these premises. The argument falls apart.
But even with this first assumption, the conclusion still doesn’t yet follow. What does follow is that often people say one thing and do another. In other words, people are often hypocritical. But that’s not what the actual conclusion says. The actual conclusion says that people often “portray themselves as they wish to be perceived.” Where did that come from? Is being sick of those shows how they “wish to be perceived” or were they simply answering the poll questions without regard to how they “wish to be perceived”? If I tell you I don’t like ice cream, you can’t automatically assume that I wish to be perceived as someone who doesn’t like ice cream. Perhaps I’m just telling you that I don’t like ice cream and the thought never occurred to me that it would make me look bad. Seriously, what kind of degenerate doesn’t like ice cream? That’s the second assumption. At least some people who told the polls that they’re sick of the shows and don’t want to watch them anymore wish to be perceived as being sick of the shows and not wanting to watch anymore.
These two assumptions show up in Answer Choice (B) and Correct Answer Choice (E).
(B) goes after the first assumption and says that last year, “almost everyone” who said they’re sick of the shows and unwilling to watch anymore continued to watch. This is really helpful for the argument. But it’s not necessary. We don’t need “almost everyone.” We just need “some” people. Think about what “almost everyone” means. Yeah, it’s ambiguous but that doesn’t mean it has no obviously right and wrong interpretations. 95% would obviously be “almost everyone” and 60% would obviously not be “almost everyone.” But if it is in fact the case that 60% of those who said they’re sick of the shows yet watched anyway, then it's still really good for the argument. It’s not as good as 95% but it’s still good. That demonstrates (B) as unnecessary.
(E) goes after the second assumption and says that last year, “at least some” people who responded to the polls wished to be perceived as unwilling to watch the shows. That’s exactly right. If this were false, then that means nobody who responded to the polls wished to be perceived as unwilling to watch the shows. That would render the conclusion unsupportable on the basis of the premises.
Answer Choice (A) can be eliminated because of “everyone.” That’s even more unnecessary than “almost everyone” in (B). There’s another problem. (A) is trying to say that there must be an overlap between people who said they’re sick of the shows and people who said they’re unwilling to watch the shows. That’s not necessary. What we actually need is an overlap between either of those two sets with the set of people who in fact watched the shows.
Answer Choice (C) says “at least some,” which is good. The rest of it is not. (C) says at least some people who responded to the polls don’t believe that in their responses they’re portraying themselves as they actually were. In other words, some people were intentionally misrepresenting themselves through their response. Do we need that to be true? No. It’s fine if no one intentionally misrepresented themselves. They still could have unintentionally misrepresented themselves. The conclusion accommodated this already when it said “whether or not they’re aware of it.”
Answer Choice (D) says “no one” who responded to the polls portrayed themselves as they actually were. So everyone misrepresented themselves, whether they meant to or not. We don’t need this either. The argument doesn’t care if half of the people misrepresented themselves.
This is an SA question.
The stimulus begins a premise that defines “practical intelligence” as “the ability to discover means to ends.” Next, another premise places “practical intelligence” as a member in the set of “skills” and “skills” do not develop on their own.
Now we get a conditional conclusion. If there’s a being that was never deprived of anything and was always and immediately given what it wanted, then that being could never possess “practical intelligence.”
Clearly, there’s a missing link. What is it?
This argument doesn’t translate neatly into conditional logic. But at a high level, you know the conclusion is arguing for this being not having practical intelligence. On the basis of what? On the basis of what this being is and on the basis of what practical intelligence is. The premises tell us that practical intelligence is a skill, and more specifically, it’s a skill to discover means to ends. So that’s an opening. And all we know about the being is that it’s never deprived of anything and gets whatever it wants immediately. These two ideas already connect together. Together, it means that this being is never in need of practical intelligence. Why not? Because think about what practical intelligence is. It’s the ability to discover means to ends. But this being always and immediately gets whatever it wants. Therefore, it’s never in need of discovering means to ends. Does that mean it will never possess the ability to discover means to ends? In other words, is it true that if it doesn’t need practical intelligence, then it won’t have practical intelligence?
Correct Answer Choice (B) says it’s true. It says that skills are acquired only if they are needed. Contrapositive: if skills are not needed, then they are not acquired. Kick the idea of “skills” up into the domain. We know practical intelligence is a skill and so this rule applies to practical intelligence. If it’s not needed, then it won’t be acquired. The premises trigger the sufficient condition. Therefore, we can draw the necessary condition as the conclusion.
Answer Choice (A) is a conditional constructed using “without.” Translated, (A) says that acquiring a skill requires the help of others. But the problem here is that the premises don’t trigger the failure of the necessary condition. The premises don’t amount to other beings not helping this being. In fact, if we take seriously the claim that this being gets whatever it wants, then as soon as it wants others to help it, others will help it.
Answer Choice (C) talks about the best way to acquire practical intelligence. But that implies there are other ways. So at best, this precludes the being in the argument from the best way of acquiring practical intelligence. That doesn’t preclude all ways.
Answer Choice (D) talks about a being that is already practically intelligent and how it gets what it wants. We don’t care. We’re trying to make an argument that this being cannot be a being that is practically intelligent. Telling us about beings that are already practically intelligent doesn’t help.
Answer Choice (E) talks about a being that is always deprived of what it wants. At this point, we can eliminate this answer. The premises fail this sufficient condition. Our being is never deprived of what it wants. Failing the sufficient condition renders this rule irrelevant.
A
A being cannot acquire a skill without the help of others.
B
Skills are acquired only if they are needed.
C
The best way to learn how to acquire something is to be deprived of it.
D
A being with practical intelligence would get what it wants entirely through the use of its practical intelligence.
E
If a being were always deprived of what it wanted, it could not acquire practical intelligence.
This is an SA question.
The stimulus begins a premise that defines “practical intelligence” as “the ability to discover means to ends.” Next, another premise places “practical intelligence” as a member in the set of “skills” and “skills” do not develop on their own.
Now we get a conditional conclusion. If there’s a being that was never deprived of anything and was always and immediately given what it wanted, then that being could never possess “practical intelligence.”
Clearly, there’s a missing link. What is it?
This argument doesn’t translate neatly into conditional logic. But at a high level, you know the conclusion is arguing for this being not having practical intelligence. On the basis of what? On the basis of what this being is and on the basis of what practical intelligence is. The premises tell us that practical intelligence is a skill, and more specifically, it’s a skill to discover means to ends. So that’s an opening. And all we know about the being is that it’s never deprived of anything and gets whatever it wants immediately. These two ideas already connect together. Together, it means that this being is never in need of practical intelligence. Why not? Because think about what practical intelligence is. It’s the ability to discover means to ends. But this being always and immediately gets whatever it wants. Therefore, it’s never in need of discovering means to ends. Does that mean it will never possess the ability to discover means to ends? In other words, is it true that if it doesn’t need practical intelligence, then it won’t have practical intelligence?
Correct Answer Choice (B) says it’s true. It says that skills are acquired only if they are needed. Contrapositive: if skills are not needed, then they are not acquired. Kick the idea of “skills” up into the domain. We know practical intelligence is a skill and so this rule applies to practical intelligence. If it’s not needed, then it won’t be acquired. The premises trigger the sufficient condition. Therefore, we can draw the necessary condition as the conclusion.
Answer Choice (A) is a conditional constructed using “without.” Translated, (A) says that acquiring a skill requires the help of others. But the problem here is that the premises don’t trigger the failure of the necessary condition. The premises don’t amount to other beings not helping this being. In fact, if we take seriously the claim that this being gets whatever it wants, then as soon as it wants others to help it, others will help it.
Answer Choice (C) talks about the best way to acquire practical intelligence. But that implies there are other ways. So at best, this precludes the being in the argument from the best way of acquiring practical intelligence. That doesn’t preclude all ways.
Answer Choice (D) talks about a being that is already practically intelligent and how it gets what it wants. We don’t care. We’re trying to make an argument that this being cannot be a being that is practically intelligent. Telling us about beings that are already practically intelligent doesn’t help.
Answer Choice (E) talks about a being that is always deprived of what it wants. At this point, we can eliminate this answer. The premises fail this sufficient condition. Our being is never deprived of what it wants. Failing the sufficient condition renders this rule irrelevant.
The question stem says the reasoning in which one of the following is most strongly supported by the guidelines. This is a rarer type of question though we have seen it plenty before. It’s like MSS in that the support flows down from the stimulus into the answers. They're asking us to take the guidelines in the stimulus and push them into the arguments in the answers to improve their reasoning. But that’s like a PSA question. Instead of the stimulus containing an argument searching for a conditional in the answer, it's the other way around. The stimulus contains a conditional searching for an argument. This is a cosmetic difference.
The stimulus gives us a ton of rules in conditional form. The first one is that if a radiant floor cooling system is to be installed or if it is to be a luxury hotel, then a radiant floor heating system must be installed. The sufficient condition here is a disjunctive, it's "or." That means we can split the arrow, so to speak. A radiant floor cooling system and a luxury hotel are each independently sufficient to demand the installation of radiant floor heating.
rf-cool → rf-heat
luxury → rf-heat
The next sentence is the only other conditional. It hooks up to radiant floor cooling. It says a radiant floor cooling system should not be installed in any hotel that is located in a region that tends to have high humidity during the summer. That means a necessary condition of installing radiant floor cooling is not high summer humidity. Or, contrapositively, if we’re in a hotel located in a region that tends to have high summer humidity, then no radiant floor cooling.
rf-cool → /region-high-sum-hum
Before looking at the answers, take stock of what conclusions are reachable. In general, we can run conditionals forward or contrapose backwards. Running them forward reaches the necessary conditions. Contraposing them backwards reaches the failure of the sufficient conditions. For these conditionals, that means there are four reachable conclusions:
rf-heat (either satisfying rf-cool or luxury)
/region-high-sum-hum (satisfying rf-cool)
/rf-cool (either failing rf-heat or failing /region-high-sum-hum)
/luxury (failing rf-heat)
It’s also important to take note of what conclusions are unreachable. That will help us quickly eliminate answers that are wrong on the basis of their logic alone. In general, affirmation of the necessary condition and the failure of the sufficient conditions are unreachable. Here, that means conclusions of rf-cool or /rf-heat are unreachable.
The first pair of answers I want to consider is Answer Choice (D) and Answer Choice (E). They both contain unreachable conclusions and hence are both wrong on the basis of their logic alone. Look at the conclusions in each. (D) concludes that the newest Bonjour hotel should have neither radiant floor heating nor radiant floor cooling. The “/rf-heat” portion of the conclusion is unreachable. (E) concludes just the opposite, that it should have both. The “rf-cool” portion of the conclusion is unreachable.
The conditionals in the stimulus cannot possibly be used to arrive at those conclusions. We were not told the necessary conditions of having radiant floor heating. And because we weren't told those necessary conditions, we don't know what to fail in order to draw the conclusion that there should be no radiant floor heating. This is the same logic with regard to radiant floor cooling. We need to know what its sufficient conditions are. But the stimulus doesn't tell us what the sufficient conditions of having radiant floor cooling are. Therefore we don't know what we need to satisfy to trigger radiant floor cooling.
Now contrast with Correct Answer Choice (B). It concludes that the newest Bonjour hotel should have radiant floor heating but not radiant floor cooling, rf-heat and /rf-cool. Those are reachable conclusions. (B) says that the region has high humidity year-round. That means it has high humidity during the summer. That fails a necessary condition of rf-cool. (B) also says that the hotel will be luxury. That satisfies one of the sufficient conditions for rf-heat.
Answer Choice (A) and Answer Choice (C) don’t suffer from logic issues like (D) and (E). They both contain reachable conclusions: /rf-cool. We can reach that conclusion in two ways, either failing rf-heat or failing /region-high-sum-hum, meaning either saying that the hotel won’t have radiant floor heating or saying that the hotel will be in a region with high summer humidity. But (A) and (C) don’t do either.
(A) says it’s not newly constructed. That immediately kicks it out of the domain of the stimulus which is guidelines for newly constructed hotels.
(A) and (C) both say that they are not luxury, but that doesn’t trigger anything.
(C) also says the newest Bonjour hotel will have radiant floor heating. That also triggers nothing.
The question stem says the reasoning in which one of the following is most strongly supported by the guidelines. This is a rarer type of question though we have seen it plenty before. It’s like MSS in that the support flows down from the stimulus into the answers. They're asking us to take the guidelines in the stimulus and push them into the arguments in the answers to improve their reasoning. But that’s like a PSA question. Instead of the stimulus containing an argument searching for a conditional in the answer, it's the other way around. The stimulus contains a conditional searching for an argument. This is a cosmetic difference.
The stimulus gives us a ton of rules in conditional form. The first one is that if a radiant floor cooling system is to be installed or if it is to be a luxury hotel, then a radiant floor heating system must be installed. The sufficient condition here is a disjunctive, it's "or." That means we can split the arrow, so to speak. A radiant floor cooling system and a luxury hotel are each independently sufficient to demand the installation of radiant floor heating.
rf-cool → rf-heat
luxury → rf-heat
The next sentence is the only other conditional. It hooks up to radiant floor cooling. It says a radiant floor cooling system should not be installed in any hotel that is located in a region that tends to have high humidity during the summer. That means a necessary condition of installing radiant floor cooling is not high summer humidity. Or, contrapositively, if we’re in a hotel located in a region that tends to have high summer humidity, then no radiant floor cooling.
rf-cool → /region-high-sum-hum
Before looking at the answers, take stock of what conclusions are reachable. In general, we can run conditionals forward or contrapose backwards. Running them forward reaches the necessary conditions. Contraposing them backwards reaches the failure of the sufficient conditions. For these conditionals, that means there are four reachable conclusions:
rf-heat (either satisfying rf-cool or luxury)
/region-high-sum-hum (satisfying rf-cool)
/rf-cool (either failing rf-heat or failing /region-high-sum-hum)
/luxury (failing rf-heat)
It’s also important to take note of what conclusions are unreachable. That will help us quickly eliminate answers that are wrong on the basis of their logic alone. In general, affirmation of the necessary condition and the failure of the sufficient conditions are unreachable. Here, that means conclusions of rf-cool or /rf-heat are unreachable.
The first pair of answers I want to consider is Answer Choice (D) and Answer Choice (E). They both contain unreachable conclusions and hence are both wrong on the basis of their logic alone. Look at the conclusions in each. (D) concludes that the newest Bonjour hotel should have neither radiant floor heating nor radiant floor cooling. The “/rf-heat” portion of the conclusion is unreachable. (E) concludes just the opposite, that it should have both. The “rf-cool” portion of the conclusion is unreachable.
The conditionals in the stimulus cannot possibly be used to arrive at those conclusions. We were not told the necessary conditions of having radiant floor heating. And because we weren't told those necessary conditions, we don't know what to fail in order to draw the conclusion that there should be no radiant floor heating. This is the same logic with regard to radiant floor cooling. We need to know what its sufficient conditions are. But the stimulus doesn't tell us what the sufficient conditions of having radiant floor cooling are. Therefore we don't know what we need to satisfy to trigger radiant floor cooling.
Now contrast with Correct Answer Choice (B). It concludes that the newest Bonjour hotel should have radiant floor heating but not radiant floor cooling, rf-heat and /rf-cool. Those are reachable conclusions. (B) says that the region has high humidity year-round. That means it has high humidity during the summer. That fails a necessary condition of rf-cool. (B) also says that the hotel will be luxury. That satisfies one of the sufficient conditions for rf-heat.
Answer Choice (A) and Answer Choice (C) don’t suffer from logic issues like (D) and (E). They both contain reachable conclusions: /rf-cool. We can reach that conclusion in two ways, either failing rf-heat or failing /region-high-sum-hum, meaning either saying that the hotel won’t have radiant floor heating or saying that the hotel will be in a region with high summer humidity. But (A) and (C) don’t do either.
(A) says it’s not newly constructed. That immediately kicks it out of the domain of the stimulus which is guidelines for newly constructed hotels.
(A) and (C) both say that they are not luxury, but that doesn’t trigger anything.
(C) also says the newest Bonjour hotel will have radiant floor heating. That also triggers nothing.