Summarize Argument
The author concludes that if human souls are immortal, then the bad will be punished. This is based on the fact that the existence of “moral order,” which is a state in which bad is always punished, depends on human soulds being immortal.
Identify and Describe Flaw
The author confuses sufficient and necessary conditions. The premise establishes that human souls being immortal is necessary in order for “moral order” (bad always punished) to exist. But this doesn’t imply that if human souls are immortal, that this would be sufficient for “moral order” to exist.
A
From the assertion that something is necessary to a moral order, the argument concludes that that thing is sufficient for an element of the moral order to be realized.
The premise establishes that human souls’ immortality is necessary for moral order. But the author mistakenly thinks this is sufficient for an element of that mordal order to be true (the element of the bad always being punished).
B
The argument takes mere beliefs to be established facts.
The author does not assume or conclude that anything is an established fact. Although he describes what some cultures believe about moral order in the second sentence, he doesn’t suggest that these beliefs are true.
C
From the claim that the immortality of human souls implies that there is a moral order in the universe, the argument concludes that there being a moral order in the universe implies that human souls are immortal.
The author does not rely on a claim that immortality implies the existence of a moral order. Rather, the premise asserts that immortality is necessary for a moral order. Also, the conclusion does not assert that a moral order implies immortality.
D
The argument treats two fundamentally different conceptions of a moral order as essentially the same.
Although the author describes two conceptions of a moral order in the second sentence, the author does not treat these as the same. These play no role in supporting the conclusion. The conclusion is based on the first sentence, which describes what is necessary for a moral order.
E
The argument’s conclusion is presupposed in the definition it gives of a moral order.
The author does not use circular reasoning. The conclusion asserts that immortality is sufficient for an aspect of moral order. This idea is not assumed in the premise, which asserts instead that immortality is necessary for moral order.
Summary
The Security Council’s structure gives permanent veto power to only those nations that were major powers at the end of World War II. The reason is that major powers are the ones responsible for keeping world peace, and they shouldn’t be made to enforce decisions that they strongly disagree with.
Notable Assumptions
The support says why any major power should have veto powers. But there’s no explanation for why only the major powers at the end of World War II should have those veto powers, or why they should have them permanently. By the argument’s premises, any new major powers should also be given veto powers, and if one of the original five ceased to be a major power, there would be no more reason for it to have veto powers.
The reasoning must assume both that no new major powers will arise and that none of the original five will cease to be a major power.
A
it does not make sense to provide for democracy among nations when nations themselves are not all democracies
We don’t know whether the members of the Security Council are all democracies, or whether the Security Council’s veto structure fails to “provide for democracy.” Since the argument doesn’t involve either of these considerations, it can’t depend on any assumptions about them.
B
no nation that was not among the major powers at the end of the Second World War would become a major power
In other words, no other nations would become major powers. If negated—if other nations were to become major powers—the premises would support giving those other nations veto powers too. So the premises support restricting veto powers to the original five only if (B) is assumed.
C
nations would not eventually gravitate into large geographical blocs, each containing minor powers as well as at least one major power
Allegiances have no effect on the reasoning. The argument is that the five major powers should have permanent, sole veto power so that as peacekeepers, they can say “no” to decisions they strongly disagree with. Whether they form blocs is irrelevant.
D
minor powers would not ally themselves with major powers to gain the protection of the veto exercised by major powers
Allegiances have no effect on the reasoning. The argument is that the five major powers should have permanent, sole veto power so that as peacekeepers, they can say “no” to decisions they strongly disagree with. Whether those vetoes protect allies is irrelevant.
E
decisions reached by a majority of nations in response to threats to world peace would be biased in favor of one or more major powers
Whether decisions are biased has no effect on the reasoning. The argument is that the five major powers should have permanent, sole veto power so that as peacekeepers, they can say “no” to decisions they strongly disagree with. The content or bias of any decision is irrelevant.
Summarize Argument: Phenomenon-Hypothesis
The author concludes that, contrary to the recent article, the rate of animal extinctions is indeed accelerating. She supports this hypothesis with the observation that more fish species have gone extinct since 1950 than went extinct between 1900-1950.
Notable Assumptions
The author takes a very small sample—the number of fish extinctions in each of two time periods—and assumes that they accurately reflect a trend toward increasing extinctions of animals in general. This means she assumes that fish extinctions weren’t significantly higher prior to 1900, and also that the rate of extinction hasn’t now started to slow down. She also assumes that the rate of fish extinctions accurately represents what’s happening with other animal species more broadly.
A
Were the fish species and subspecies that became extinct unrepresentative of animal species in general with regard to their pattern of extinction?
If yes, then there’s no reason to conclude that the overall rate of animal extinctions is increasing. If no, then the data on fish suggest more strongly that extinction is accelerating for other animals, too.
B
How numerous were the populations in 1950 of the species and subspecies of North American fishes that have become extinct since 1950?
Irrelevant—the argument isn’t concerned with the population dynamics of any individual species. The argument is focused solely on whether or not populations have gone completely extinct, and how the total number of extinctions is changing over time.
C
Did any of the species or subspecies of North American fishes that became extinct in the twentieth century originate in regions outside of North America?
Irrelevant—the origins of those fishes have no bearing on the extinction numbers being reported.
D
What proportion of North American fish species and subspecies whose populations were endangered in 1950 are now thriving?
Irrelevant—the argument isn’t concerned with the population dynamics of any individual species. The argument is focused solely on whether or not populations have gone extinct, and how the number of extinctions is changing over time.
E
Were any of the species or subspecies of North American fishes that became extinct in the twentieth century commercially important?
Irrelevant—the argument isn’t concerned with which fish species went extinct or what those species might have been used for. The argument is focused solely on the number of extinctions and how that number is changing over time.
A
The pursuit of paradise does not justify murder.
We never talked about “justifying” murder. Besides, the historian leaves open the possibility that murder would’ve been acceptable in Q had paradise been an attainable goal.
B
The pursuit of paradise justifies fanaticism.
The historian argues that ordinary people pursuing paradise are just ordinary people, not fanatics. We don’t care about what justifies being a fantatic.
C
Execution in pursuit of what is later found to be unattainable constitutes murder.
The historian concludes that many ordinary people in Q were murders precisely because their goal of paradise was unattainable. This principle perfectly validates that claim.
D
Fanaticism in pursuit of paradise constitutes inhumanity.
The historian never talks about inhumanity.
E
Enthusiasm in pursuit of what is eventually found to be unattainable constitutes fanaticism.
The historian says those people weren’t fanatics. Murderers, yes. But not fanatics.