Rosen: One cannot prepare a good meal from bad food, produce good food from bad soil, maintain good soil without good farming, or have good farming without a culture that places value on the proper maintenance of all its natural resources so that needed supplies are always available.
Summary
Good meal → NOT bad food
Good food → NOT bad soil
Good soil → Good farming
Good farming → culture that places value on maintaining natural resources
Very Strongly Supported Conclusions
Normally, I wouldn’t think “NOT bad food” implies “good food,” since there might be something that’s just not bad and not good — just middle-of-the-road food. Same thing with “NOT bad soil” and “good soil.”
But, the stimulus seems to be set up in order for us to draw a conditional chain connecting every statement.
Good meal → good food → good soil → good farming → culture that places value on maintining natural resources.
I know this seems inappropriate, but consider this problem unusual, and don’t draw too many lessons from it. Think of this problem as an exception.
A
The creation of good meals depends on both natural and cultural conditions.
Supported, if we accept the conditional chain starting with “good meal” and ending with “culture that maintains natural resources.” A good meal depends on natural conditions, such as soil. And it depends on cultural conditions, such as a culture’s view of natural resources.
B
Natural resources cannot be maintained properly without good farming practices.
We know good farming is necessary for good soil. But there’s no support for the claim that good farming is necessary for maintaining natural resources. There are many other kinds of natural resources besides soil, and we don’t know whether good farming is related to those other resources.
C
Good soil is a prerequisite of good farming.
We know good farming is necessary for good soil. But this doesn’t mean good soil is necessary (prerequisite) for good farming.
D
Any society with good cultural values will have a good cuisine.
We don’t know anything about good “cuisine.” A cuisine is different from a meal. We also don’t know that “good cultural values” is sufficient for anything.
E
When food is bad, it is because of poor soil and, ultimately, bad farming practices.
Food might be bad for other reasons besides poor soil and bad farming. We know that good food requires good soil and good farming, but it might also require other things. So we might have good soil and good farming, but still end up with bad food.
A
Only organisms of types that originated through endosymbiosis contain nucleomorphs.
B
A nucleomorph within the chlorarachniophyte holds all of the genetic material of some other organism.
C
Nucleomorphs originated when an organism endosymbiotically engulfed a chlorarachniophyte.
D
Two organisms will not undergo endosymbiosis unless at least one of them contains a nucleomorph.
E
Chlorarachniophytes emerged as the result of two organisms having undergone endosymbiosis.
If the statements above are true, which one of the following can be most reasonably inferred from them?
This is a Most Strongly Supported question, because we are looking for what can be “most reasonably inferred” from the stimulus.
One of the great difficulties in establishing animal rights based merely on the fact that animals are living things concerns scope.
Apparently, “scope” is one of the difficulties of trying to establish animal rights based solely on the fact that animals are living things. In other words, if you argue that, because animals are living things, they deserve rights – you’ll run into a problem of “scope.”
If one construes the term “living things” broadly, one is bound to bestow rights on organisms that are not animals (e.g., plants).
This is the beginning of the stimulus’s explanation of the problem of “scope.” If we interpret “living things” broadly, we’ll have to give rights to organisms that aren’t animals. Plants are living things, aren’t they? So they’d deserve rights. But that would be too broad. It would be over-inclusive (if all we wanted to protect were animals).
But if this term is construed narrowly, one is apt to refuse rights to organisms that, at least biologically, are considered members of the animal kingdom.
What if we interpret “living things” narrowly? Then the problem of “scope” is that some things that are biologically considered animals would end up not getting rights. For example, if you interpret “living things” as only multi-celled organisms that can move from one place to another by their own power, you’d be leaving out sea sponges and barnacles from your definition, since they can’t move by themselves. But they’re biologically considered animals. So that’s the opposite problem: under-inclusive.
The last two sentences, together, describe the problem of “scope.” If you interpret “living things” broadly, some things that shouldn’t get rights will get rights: over-inclusive. But if you interpret “living things” narrowly, some things that are animals won’t end up getting rights: under-inclusive.
There’s no clear conclusion to anticipate based on the stimulus, so let’s get into the answers and identify the one that is most strongly supported via process of elimination. The correct answer is likely to have something to do with the problem of “scope,” but beyond that, it’s difficult to make any prediction.
Answer Choice (A) Not all animals should be given rights.
The stimulus does not support any normative claim about animal rights. The stimulus provides commentary on one of the difficulties that you’ll encounter if you try to justify animal rights based on the fact that animals are living things. But commentary on the problems of a particular argument in support of animal rights does not support a normative claim about who should or should not have rights. For example, if I say that one problem with trying to lose weight solely by dieting is that it relies only on willpower, I’m not expressing any opinion about whether you should or should not try to lose weight. I’m simply commenting on the effectiveness of one method of losing weight.
Answer Choice (B) One cannot bestow rights on animals without also bestowing rights on at least some plants.
(B) would be supported if two things were true: (1) We had to establish animal rights based merely on the fact that they are living things; and (2) We had to interpret “living things” broadly. If both were true, then we’d bestow rights on organisms that are not animals, such as plants. But neither has to be true. We could try to anchor animal rights to whether they are sentient or can suffer. We also don’t have to interpret “living things” broadly. We could interpret the phrase narrowly. So this answer is not correct.
Answer Choice (C) The problem of delineating the boundary of the set of living things interferes with every attempt to establish animal rights.
The correct version of (C) would go like this: The problem of delineating the boundary of the set of living things interferes with one attempt to establish animal rights.
But the original version of (C) is tempting, because the stimulus presented a problem of “scope” in connection with establishing animal rights. And, it’s fair to describe the problem of “scope” in the stimulus as the problem of delineating the boundary of the set of living things.
The flaw with this answer is that the problem of “scope” as described by the stimulus arises when you try to establish animal rights based merely on the fact that animals are living things. But that’s just one potential premise on which you might try to establish rights. And we don’t have to use that premise.
We could instead try to establish animal rights based on something else: Animals feel pain, and therefore they deserve rights. Animals are cute, and therefore they deserve rights. Animals were created by an omnipotent deity, and therefore they deserve rights. These are all different potential arguments we could make in support of animal rights. And none of these arguments relate to the boundary of “living things.” These arguments would have their own problems of scope, of course, because it’s exceedingly difficult to draw the boundaries just right. What is the set of things that feel pain? Or things that are cute? Or things that are created by an omnipotent deity? Could these sets be too broad or too narrow? Almost certainly. But the key is that these problems of scope are not related to what counts as a “living thing.”
The problem of the scope of “living things” arises only when we try to justify animal rights based solely on animals being “living things.” But it does not arise with every attempt to establish animal rights.
Correct Answer Choice (D) Successful attempts to establish rights for all animals are likely either to establish rights for some plants or not to depend solely on the observation that animals are living things.
It’s probably easier to get to (D) through process of elimination than through a complete, perfect understanding of the answer. But let’s unpack it and see why it is supported.
If we want to have a successful attempt to establish rights for all animals, what kind of interpretation of “living things” might we have? If our interpretation is narrow, the stimulus says that some things that are biologically animals won’t end up getting rights. So that’s out of the question. To establish rights for all animals, then, we can’t have a narrow interpretation.
But the only alternative interpretation of “living things” the stimulus discusses is a broad interpretation. And if we interpret “living things” broadly, then some things that aren’t animals will get rights (such as plants). So if we try to establish rights for all animals based merely on the fact that animals are living things, then we would interpret “living things” broadly, and grant rights to some plants.
But, there’s one alternative to this path. What if we try to establish rights for all animals based on some other ground besides animals being living things? In this case, we wouldn’t be forced to grant rights to plants.
So to recap, there are three potential paths to establishing animal rights:
(1) solely on the ground that animals are living things, and interpreting “living things” narrowly – this will leave some animals unprotected
(2) solely on the ground that animals are living things, and interpreting “living things” broadly – this will grant rights to plants
(3) not solely on the ground that animals are living things – there would be some other reason for animal rights besides animals being living things
Option (1) doesn’t protect all animals. So if we want to establish rights for all animals, we must go through path (2) or (3). This is what (D) says. Successful attempts to establish rights for all animals are likely to establish rights for some plants – path (2) – or not depend solely on the observation that animals are living things – path (3).
(Note that in theory, it’s possible to interpret “living things” neither too narrowly nor too broadly. So in theory, there is still a way to establish rights for all animals based on the fact they are living things, without having to grant rights to plants. This is why (D) uses the word “likely” – it doesn’t have to be certain that granting all animals rights requires path (2) or path (3); it just has to be likely. And indeed, it is likely because it’s exceedingly difficult to draw the boundaries just right.)
Answer Choice (E) The fact that animals are living things is irrelevant to the question of whether animals should or should not be accorded rights, because plants are living things too.
The stimulus describes a problem with establishing animal rights based merely on the fact that animals are living things. But this doesn’t mean the author of the stimulus believes that the fact animals are living is irrelevant to the question of their rights. It’s entirely possible that the author thinks that we should adopt a broad interpretation of “living things” and that we should be OK with granting rights to plants and other non-animals. Or, it’s possible the author thinks that the fact animals are living things is an important factor in whether they deserve rights, but should not be the only factor.
Put another way, although the author of the stimulus describes a strategic problem with establishing rights based on animals being “living things,” the stimulus does not tell us the author’s personal opinion about the importance or relevance of “living things” in establishing rights. For example, if I say that one problem with trying to lose weight solely by dieting is that it relies only on willpower, I’m not saying anything about whether dieting should play a small or large role in trying to lose weight. I’m simply describing a strategic problem with relying solely on dieting; I’m not sharing a value judgment about the importance or relevance of dieting. I might think dieting is still very important and that you should do it if you want to lose weight, despite the problem I described.