This is an NA question.
The stimulus is abstract so to better understand what it’s saying, we should translate it into something more tangible.
Let’s take “Friends” as the example of the popular TV show. The stimulus is saying that selling reruns of “Friends” while “Friends” is still running on NBC can lead to decreased revenues for NBC. So in other words, new episodes of “Friends” are still being released on NBC but simultaneously, Season 1, 2, 3, etc.’s reruns are also being broadcast on, say, Netflix. The first sentence is saying that would be bad for NBC’s revenues. Okay, but why? I suspect that’s the conclusion.
This next sentence, however, doesn't support this. It just says the show's producers do earn a great deal of money from the sale of the syndication rights because the stations rerunning the programs are assured of a successful show. Okay, so when Netflix buys “Friends,” it’s assured of a successful show so it’s happy to pay the producers a great deal of money. But what does this have to do with NBC, the network, suffering a decrease in revenue? Nothing. This seems like just a throwaway claim. A concession claim.
"However" signals a transition from this throwaway claim, this concession point, to a premise. Good, I’m eager to know why NBC is going to lose money on this deal.
A recent study shows that over 80% of the programs that are made available as reruns and as first-run episodes during the same season suffer an immediate ratings drop for their first-run episodes.
Hmm, okay. So if Season 8 Episode 1 of “Friends” is premiering on NBC, but you've already sold the rights for Seasons 1 through 7 to Netflix, then it's likely that Season 8 Episode 1 is going to suffer an immediate ratings drop. Because that’s what happens 80% of the time.
So that's why NBC will lose money.
Wait a second. The premise is about ratings drop, but the conclusion is about losing revenues. Well, I know what kind of NA question this is. It's one where we have to connect some concept from the premise to some concept in the conclusion. We have to build a bridge from the premise to the conclusion.
For example, a bridge that says ratings drop is relevant to revenue decrease. If that’s not the case, then we have no premise. I mean it, because for something to be a premise, it has to lend at least some support. So if ratings drop had nothing to do with revenue decrease, then there is no premise because there's no support, in which case the argument falls apart.
That’s why (B) is the Correct Answer Choice. A drop in ratings has a negative effect on the network's revenues. This must be true.
Answer Choice (A) says programs that are sold into syndication early tend to be long-running hits that are likely to decline soon.
If this were an RRE question, maybe (A) would be relevant. Imagine the stimulus said something like, a recent study showed that over 80% of programs that are sold into syndication early suffered a ratings drop, and networks consequently experienced decreased revenues as a result. In spite of this, programs are still sold into syndication early. Why? Resolve, reconcile, explain it.
Well, now (A) might do some work. Why? Because the producers of the programs know that they are on the decline anyway and so they want to maximize the value of the shows before they’re completely worthless.
Answer Choice (C) says the price of syndication rights includes some compensation for the network's probable losses. This is not necessary. What if the price of syndication rights didn't include any compensation for the network's probable loss? Who cares? It's not like we're trying to figure out ways to incentivize the network to actually proceed with the deal of selling the syndication rights.
That’s what (C) is concerned with. (C)'s like, “Oh man, I'd better add something to sweeten the deal, otherwise NBC is going to back out of this. Oh, I know. I'm going to tell NBC that my purchase price for the syndication rights for “Friends” will include compensation for what you, NBC, might lose as a result of this deal.”
(C) makes sense in that way, but (C) doesn't make sense at all as a necessary assumption. In the argument, the deal is already done and we're just trying to say what the probable consequences are. It can lead to decreased revenue. And the only premise upon which we have to make this conclusion is because of the study showing the ratings drop. So once again, the assumption is between ratings and revenue. Nothing to do with (C).
Answer Choice (D) says the audience of a popular program will usually prefer first-run episodes to reruns. Okay, so the audience of “Friends,” they usually will prefer a new episode to reruns. That's not necessary.
Imagine it were false. The audience is either indifferent or actually they slightly prefer older episodes. What does that matter? It doesn’t because the premise is still what it is. A study came out that says 80% of programs that are made as reruns and as first-run episodes experienced an immediate ratings drop. On the back of that premise, which is still the only premise we have, we’re arguing that if you sell the syndication rights, it's going to lead to decreased revenue.
So what is (D) doing? How does (D) relate to the argument, if at all? I think (D) might be trying to explain why the study found what it found. Why is it that 80% of the programs experience ratings drop? Maybe it’s because of something having to do with what the audience prefers. But okay, that’s not our job. This isn’t a situation where we have a phenomenon (the study) and then we’re being asked to supply some hypothesis to explain the phenomenon.
Answer Choice (E) says most programs are never sold into syndication. This is not necessary. What if this were false? Imagine that all programs are sold into syndication at some point. It doesn’t matter. The argument is still what it is, with the same missing link that it always had. That missing link has nothing to do with what happens to most programs, whether they eventually get sold into syndication or not.
This is a Miscellaneous question.
According to the question stem, the analysis portion of the stimulus applies to the situation portion of the stimulus in the same appropriate way that would also apply to four of the answer choices. Note the word “EXCEPT” in the stem.
The question tests reasoning by analogy, reasoning from principle to application, and causal reasoning.
The situation is that a physical therapist (1) wants her patients to derive more enjoyment from the challenge of developing physical skills. She also (2) wants them to spend more time practicing those skills.
The analysis says success in meeting the first objective (derive enjoyment) will bring about success in meeting the second objective (spend more time).
The analysis seems appropriate for the situation as along as we make the (quite reasonable) assumption that enjoyment of an activity causes more time to be spent on that activity. If we view that causal assumption (extracted from the analysis) as a principle, then the situation can be viewed as an application of that principle. The analysis itself is a more general version of that causal principle.
In evaluating the answer choices, we can continue to use that framework and look for four more applications of the general principle. Alternatively, we can use the framework of analogies. We’re on the lookout for four analogous situations. On what grounds do we judge how analogous the new situations are to the existing one? In other words, what counts as “relevant similarity”? How well the new situations conform to the causal principle. The two frameworks converge.
Answer Choice (A) says a math teacher (1) wants her students to understand the mathematical principles taught in her course and (2) wants them to apply these principles routinely in everyday life. This is analogous. This is an appropriate application of the causal principle in the analysis.
If a math teacher is successful in getting her students to understand the principles of geometry, algebra, or statistics, then that will have a positive causal impact on their applying those principles in everyday life.
Answer Choice (B) says a software manufacturer (1) wants its customers to be more satisfied with the product and (2) wants them to place fewer calls to the service representative about how to use the product. This is analogous. This is an appropriate application of the causal principle in the analysis.
If the software manufacturer is successful in getting its customers to be more satisfied with the product, then its customers will be less likely to place calls about how to use it. There are many ways in which one can be unsatisfied with a product, of course, but one of those ways is not understanding how to use the product, which leads to (causes) customer support calls. If overall satisfaction is improved, then the problem of not understanding how to use the product will be mitigated to some degree. Whatever that level of improvement is should lead to (cause) fewer customer support calls.
Answer Choice (C) says a librarian (1) wants fewer of the books borrowed from the library to be lost or stolen, and he also (2) wants more of the books to be returned on time. This is analogous. This is an appropriate application of the causal principle in the analysis.
Of the entire set of books that are borrowed, some of them are lost and some of them are stolen. Lost is accidental whereas stolen is intentional. If the librarian is successful in reducing the number of lost or stolen books, then it is very likely that that will cause more books to be returned on time. Why? Because it’s precisely the books that would otherwise have been lost or stolen (which guarantees that they won’t be returned on time) that will now be returned on time.
Correct Answer Choice (D) says a hardware retail company (1) wants to construct a new, larger warehouse, and it also (2) wants its employees to help plan how the old warehouse will be expanded. This is not analogous. This is not an appropriate application of the causal principle in the analysis.
The first objective and the second are disconnected, and hence success in meeting the first has no causal bearing on success in meeting the second.
Success in meeting the first objective seems just as likely to have a positively causal impact on the second objective as it is to have a negative causal impact.
Imagine the first objective is successfully achieved. Congrats. You built a new, larger warehouse. How does that impact your second objective? I don't know. It could be positive or negative.
Maybe the old employees from the original warehouse are like, “I am revitalized with energy to make this work because we can't have the crew at the new warehouse show us up. We'd better do a really good job of expanding the old warehouse.”
But maybe the old employees are instead demoralized. They look at the second, new, larger warehouse and they don’t see why they need to do a good job planning the expansion of their current warehouse.
Answer Choice (E) says a concert series director (1) wants to present a more varied repertoire and (2) wants to attract new patrons. This is analogous. This is an appropriate application of the causal principle in the analysis.
If the director is successful in presenting a more varied repertoire (doing stuff that they haven't done before, new stuff), then it seems reasonably likely that they’ll attract (cause) new patrons (people who didn't come to the concert before because the repertoire was narrow).
This is a Parallel Flaw Method of Reasoning question.
The question tests your understanding of quantifier and conditional logic.
The argument in the stimulus translates to:
fl-journalist ←s→ sell-lax-mag → /self-respecting
__________________
/fl-journalist ←s→ self-respecting
The conclusion is flawed. The valid conclusion that could have been drawn is:
fl-journalist ←s→ /self-respecting
Generalizing from this particular flawed argument, the form is this:
A ←s→ B → /C
__________________
/A ←s→ C
We need to find the same form in one of the answer choices.
Answer Choice (A)’s premise translates to:
high-school ←s→ bio → /kindergarten
In order for (A) to be right, the conclusion should have said:
/high-school ←s→ kindergarten
Or in English, “Some kindergarten teachers are not high school teachers.” But it doesn’t say that. It says “Biology is not taught by all teachers.” That’s a valid conclusion. It follows simply from the premise that kindergarten teachers don’t teach biology.
Answer Choice (B)’s premise translates to:
sbm —m→ teacher → /prefer
Like (A), this is a good setup for (B) to be right. In order for (B) to be right, the conclusion should have said:
/sbm ←s→ prefer
Or in English, “Some non-school board members prefer admin work to teaching.” But it doesn’t say that. It says, “Few school board members prefer admin work to teaching.”
Correct Answer Choice (C)’s premise translates to:
student ←s→ prefer → /member
In order for (C) to be right, the conclusion needs to say:
/student ←s→ member
Or in English, “Some members of the Calculus Club are not students.” That’s exactly what the conclusion in (C) says. This is an invalid conclusion. The valid conclusion is “student ←s→ /member” or “Some students are not members of the Calculus Club.”
Answer Choice (D)’s premise translates to:
princ ←s→ harsh-disc → /adviser
In order for (D) to be right, the conclusion should have said:
/princ ←s→ adviser
Or in English, “Some advisers to a debate team are not principals.” But it doesn’t say that. It says, “Some principals are not advisers to a debate team.” That’s a valid conclusion.
Answer Choice (E)’s premise translates to:
popular ←s→ leave-early
coaches → /leave-before-3
(E) is already wrong for the fact that the premises do not connect.
As a Blind Review exercise, we can fix (E) up:
popular ←s→ leave-early → /coach
Fixing the premises like this gives (E) a chance. (E) could say that, therefore, some coaches are not popular teachers. That would be the same formal flaw in the stimulus and therefore make (E) the right answer.
This is a Principle question.
We are to extract from this argument by analogy the underlying principle. The right answer states the principle, and the argument in the stimulus is an application of that principle.
The argument contains a premise about SUV drivers and a conclusion about cancer and smoking. It’s an argument by analogy. In order for the reasoning by analogy to run through, both the premise and conclusion have to conform to some underlying principle. Otherwise, what happens with drivers and SUVs would have little bearing on cures for cancer and behaviors like smoking.
The premise says that drivers of SUVs have the correct belief that because they're in an SUV, they're better protected. They have lower risk of serious injury. As a result, their behavior changes. Because they know they’re safer, they start to drive more recklessly. They know the negative consequences are not as bad, so they start to take on more risk.
The conclusion says that the discovery of powerful cures for certain high-incidence forms of cancer would probably trigger an increase in behaviors such as smoking and overexposure to sun that are known to increase the risk of such cancers. If we have a cure for lung cancer, then more people would smoke more. If we have a cure for skin cancer, then more people would overexpose themselves to UV light.
Is this analogous to what was described in the premise? Yes, because there is an underlying principle at work here: mitigating or eliminating the negative consequences of an action invites increased participation in that action. Another way to state that is if the risk of harm is decreased, then people will engage more in that form of risky behavior. This unifying principle is what ties together these two totally different situations. It’s how this argument’s reasoning by analogy runs through.
Answer Choice (A) says when people believe that there are several measures they could take to reduce the risk associated with a certain activity, generally they will only take the measure that they believe will most reduce that risk. That’s not the principle at work here.
For the argument to conform to this principle, we’d have to show several measures to reduce the risk associated with driving and then have the driver pick the most effective one. So maybe one measure is to get into an SUV. A second measure is to put on your seatbelt. A third measure is to have airbags. The fourth measure is don't run red lights. According to (A), the principle here is that you assign some probability to each measure and then pick the measure that will most reduce the risk associated with driving.
Correct Answer Choice (B) says the development of ways to protect people from the consequences of behavior that would normally harm them often makes people less careful to avoid such behaviors.
Yes, that’s the principle. “Behaviors that would normally harm them.” What kind of behavior are we talking about here? If applied to driving, then we’re talking about reckless driving. That's behavior that normally would harm you. “The development of ways to protect you from the consequences of reckless driving” is putting you in an SUV. Because when you're in an SUV, it lowers the risk of serious injury as a result of accidents. And as a result, you are less careful to avoid reckless driving.
It’s the same in the conclusion. The behavior that normally would harm people is, say, smoking. If we develop ways to protect people from the consequences of smoking, i.e., lung cancer, then that's going to make people smoke more.
(B) is correct because it extracts the underlying principle that analogizes these two seemingly different situations.
Answer Choice (C) says that people generally take special care to avoid behaviors that they believe would likely lead to serious harm and generally do not take special care to avoid behaviors that they believe will not harm them at all. That’s not the principle at work here.
What behaviors would likely lead to serious harm that people are avoiding? Reckless driving? But if that's the behavior, there's no indication that people are taking special care to avoid reckless driving. What behaviors won't cause harm? The argument doesn’t say. (C) has a hard time mapping onto the argument.
We could make up an argument for (C) to map onto. In general, when traffic lights turn red, everybody stops. When the lights turn green, everybody goes.
This maps onto (C). People are taking special care to avoid behaviors (running a red light) that they believe will likely lead to serious injury. People are not taking special care to avoid behavior that they believe will not harm them (running a green light). In other words, people run green lights.
Answer Choice (D) says people generally exercise more care when performing activities that they know to have risky consequences than when performing activities of unknown risk. That’s not the principle at work here.
To illustrate the principle in (D), consider two activities. Activity one you know is risky. Activity two has a risk profile that’s unknown to you. It could be just as risky, less risky, or more risky than activity one. (D) is saying that people are more careful when performing activity one. This doesn’t map onto the argument.
Moreover, I'm not sure this is a reasonable attitude. If you don't even know the risk profile associated with an activity, wouldn't it be prudent to be extra careful just in case?
Answer Choice (E) says avoiding serious harm to themselves is given a high priority by people in their behavior but avoiding lesser harm is frequently outweighed by various desires. That’s not the principle at work here.
To illustrate the principle in (E), consider the serious harm of losing your arm. You’re going to be very careful to avoid that kind of harm. Now consider the less serious harm of getting a bruise. People regularly choose to risk getting bruised because they have other desires that are more important to them. For example, if you go hiking, you might get bruised. If you play basketball, you might get bruised. The desire to go hiking or play basketball often outweighs the lesser harm of getting a bruise.
If applied to driving, then avoiding serious harm is given a high priority by people in their behavior. That’s why people don’t run red lights. But avoiding less harm is frequently outweighed by various other desires like wanting to get to a destination faster. That’s why people speed. Speeding is not as serious as running a red light, but it does increase your chances of getting hurt (and hurting others).
This is a Principle question.
We are to extract from this argument by analogy the underlying principle. The right answer states the principle, and the argument in the stimulus is an application of that principle.
The argument contains a premise about SUV drivers and a conclusion about cancer and smoking. It’s an argument by analogy. In order for the reasoning by analogy to run through, both the premise and conclusion have to conform to some underlying principle. Otherwise, what happens with drivers and SUVs would have little bearing on cures for cancer and behaviors like smoking.
The premise says that drivers of SUVs have the correct belief that because they're in an SUV, they're better protected. They have lower risk of serious injury. As a result, their behavior changes. Because they know they’re safer, they start to drive more recklessly. They know the negative consequences are not as bad, so they start to take on more risk.
The conclusion says that the discovery of powerful cures for certain high-incidence forms of cancer would probably trigger an increase in behaviors such as smoking and overexposure to sun that are known to increase the risk of such cancers. If we have a cure for lung cancer, then more people would smoke more. If we have a cure for skin cancer, then more people would overexpose themselves to UV light.
Is this analogous to what was described in the premise? Yes, because there is an underlying principle at work here: mitigating or eliminating the negative consequences of an action invites increased participation in that action. Another way to state that is if the risk of harm is decreased, then people will engage more in that form of risky behavior. This unifying principle is what ties together these two totally different situations. It’s how this argument’s reasoning by analogy runs through.
Answer Choice (A) says when people believe that there are several measures they could take to reduce the risk associated with a certain activity, generally they will only take the measure that they believe will most reduce that risk. That’s not the principle at work here.
For the argument to conform to this principle, we’d have to show several measures to reduce the risk associated with driving and then have the driver pick the most effective one. So maybe one measure is to get into an SUV. A second measure is to put on your seatbelt. A third measure is to have airbags. The fourth measure is don't run red lights. According to (A), the principle here is that you assign some probability to each measure and then pick the measure that will most reduce the risk associated with driving.
Correct Answer Choice (B) says the development of ways to protect people from the consequences of behavior that would normally harm them often makes people less careful to avoid such behaviors.
Yes, that’s the principle. “Behaviors that would normally harm them.” What kind of behavior are we talking about here? If applied to driving, then we’re talking about reckless driving. That's behavior that normally would harm you. “The development of ways to protect you from the consequences of reckless driving” is putting you in an SUV. Because when you're in an SUV, it lowers the risk of serious injury as a result of accidents. And as a result, you are less careful to avoid reckless driving.
It’s the same in the conclusion. The behavior that normally would harm people is, say, smoking. If we develop ways to protect people from the consequences of smoking, i.e., lung cancer, then that's going to make people smoke more.
(B) is correct because it extracts the underlying principle that analogizes these two seemingly different situations.
Answer Choice (C) says that people generally take special care to avoid behaviors that they believe would likely lead to serious harm and generally do not take special care to avoid behaviors that they believe will not harm them at all. That’s not the principle at work here.
What behaviors would likely lead to serious harm that people are avoiding? Reckless driving? But if that's the behavior, there's no indication that people are taking special care to avoid reckless driving. What behaviors won't cause harm? The argument doesn’t say. (C) has a hard time mapping onto the argument.
We could make up an argument for (C) to map onto. In general, when traffic lights turn red, everybody stops. When the lights turn green, everybody goes.
This maps onto (C). People are taking special care to avoid behaviors (running a red light) that they believe will likely lead to serious injury. People are not taking special care to avoid behavior that they believe will not harm them (running a green light). In other words, people run green lights.
Answer Choice (D) says people generally exercise more care when performing activities that they know to have risky consequences than when performing activities of unknown risk. That’s not the principle at work here.
To illustrate the principle in (D), consider two activities. Activity one you know is risky. Activity two has a risk profile that’s unknown to you. It could be just as risky, less risky, or more risky than activity one. (D) is saying that people are more careful when performing activity one. This doesn’t map onto the argument.
Moreover, I'm not sure this is a reasonable attitude. If you don't even know the risk profile associated with an activity, wouldn't it be prudent to be extra careful just in case?
Answer Choice (E) says avoiding serious harm to themselves is given a high priority by people in their behavior but avoiding lesser harm is frequently outweighed by various desires. That’s not the principle at work here.
To illustrate the principle in (E), consider the serious harm of losing your arm. You’re going to be very careful to avoid that kind of harm. Now consider the less serious harm of getting a bruise. People regularly choose to risk getting bruised because they have other desires that are more important to them. For example, if you go hiking, you might get bruised. If you play basketball, you might get bruised. The desire to go hiking or play basketball often outweighs the lesser harm of getting a bruise.
If applied to driving, then avoiding serious harm is given a high priority by people in their behavior. That’s why people don’t run red lights. But avoiding less harm is frequently outweighed by various other desires like wanting to get to a destination faster. That’s why people speed. Speeding is not as serious as running a red light, but it does increase your chances of getting hurt (and hurting others).
This is a Flaw/Descriptive Weakening question.
The argument contains one premise and one conclusion. The premise is that last year and the year before, Browning (a town, presumably) experienced significantly more rainfall in September than in July. The conclusion is predictive. It predicts that this year, Browning will probably also experience more rain in September than in July.
This is a terrible argument and you intuitively understand why. Two instances is not enough data to establish a pattern when it comes to rainfall. Imagine if this argument had a premise that said, “Meteorological records indicate that over the past two hundred years, Browning experienced significantly more rainfall in September than in July.” Well, now we’re talking. This is a pattern and it supports a prediction that this year, Browning will probably also experience more rain in September than in July. At least that would be the default reasonable position and the burden would be on the person claiming this year to be an exception to provide the evidence. Why? Because when it comes to rainfall patterns, two data points isn’t enough and two hundred is. Where is the line between enough and not enough? Is 30 data points enough? What about ten? I don’t know, ask a meteorologist. But you and I both know that two isn’t and two hundred is.
The flawed method of reasoning in this argument is recurring. This is a type of analogy flaw. The argument tries to draw a conclusion about the future based on information about the past. The central assumption is that the future is relevantly similar to the past. That assumption may be true or it may be false. It all depends on what specifically we’re talking about in the premises and the conclusion. Here, in this premise, we have past information that is scant. And so the conclusion about the future is poorly supported.
Correct Answer Choice (B) points this out. It says the argument is weak because it draws an inference about a future event on the basis of a very limited number of instances of related past events. That’s it.
Answer Choice (A) says that the argument contains a premise that presupposed the truth of the conclusion. This is a charge of circular reasoning, of begging the question. This is descriptively inaccurate. The premise is a description of past events. The conclusion is a prediction of a future event. The premise (about what already happened) does not presuppose the conclusion (about what likely will happen) to be true. Here’s a circular argument guilty of the charge in (A): Last year and the year before, Browning experienced significantly more rainfall in September than in July. Therefore, in the past two years, Browning experienced significantly less rainfall in July than in September.
Answer Choice (C) says that the argument overemphasizes the possibility that average rainfall statistics could be skewed by large rainfall in one year. What? “Overemphasizes”? But that possibility wasn’t even present in the argument. (C) is descriptively inaccurate.
Answer Choice (D) says that the argument concludes that “two phenomena are associated.” Hold up. Is that an accurate description of the conclusion? The most charitable reading of the conclusion to accommodate (D) would be to interpret one phenomenon as amount of rain and the other phenomenon as time, namely what month it is, namely whether it’s September or July. Stretching the bounds of reasonable interpretation, we can map (D)’s description of the conclusion onto the actual conclusion. That the amount of rainfall is associated with whether it’s September or July. Okay, fine. Let’s check out (D)’s premise descriptor. Merely from the claim that there are “many instances in which both phenomena are present.” Uh, no. Our interpretation is broken. Many instances? The premise contains two instances. Last year and the year before. Last year, “both phenomena were present”? What does that even mean? Last year there was rain and there was September/July? See, that makes no sense.
Answer Choice (E) says that the argument uses evidence drawn from a source whose reliability cannot readily be verified. No, that’s not descriptively accurate. We have no idea where the historical data came from. We therefore have no idea if that source’s reliability can or cannot be readily verified.