This is a Flaw/Descriptive Weakening question.
The student claims that his paper was not graded in accordance with the professor’s stated criteria. That sounds like the conclusion. Okay, why not? What did the professor say the criteria would be? She said that she’d give As only to papers whose conclusions were supported by reliable statistical evidence. That’s a conditional. A → rse. His paper’s conclusion was supported by rse yet he got a B.
I don’t see what the problem is here. His paper met a necessary condition for getting an A. But he’s complaining that he only got a B? Oh, he must be confused about sufficient and necessary conditions. He thought rse → A. That’s why he thinks the professor should have given him an A.
This is the oldest mistake in the book. Correct Answer Choice (C) points it out. He takes a condition that is among the requirements (necessary) for a particular grade to be a condition that is enough to guarantee (sufficient) that grade.
Answer Choice (A) says the argument discusses the prof’s criteria as a distraction. But that’s descriptively inaccurate. The argument discusses the prof’s criteria in order to apply it to the case at hand, not to call attention away from anything.
Answer Choice (B) says the argument committed the descriptive premise to prescriptive conclusion flaw. That’s not what the argument does. The argument’s conclusion and premises are all descriptive.
Answer Choice (D) says the argument is based on the report of a biased participant in the controversy. Yes, this is descriptively accurate. The student is reporting the facts to us, facts about what the stated criteria was and facts about his paper. He is presumably biased. But so what? It’s not because of his bias that this argument is weak. His argument is weak because of a logical error.
Answer Choice (E) says the argument conflated the professor’s grading criteria with the objective criteria of a paper’s quality. What does this mean? (E) claims that there are two different criteria. There’s the professor’s criteria for grading (A only if rse). Then there’s the objective criteria for quality. What is it? (E) doesn’t say but presumably it’s different from the prof’s criteria. But there’s just one criteria. It’s not like the student argued that his paper met the prof’s criteria and therefore must be an objectively high-quality paper.
This is a Flaw/Descriptive Weakening question.
The argument opens with a general principle. Generally, it’s important that people practice what they preach but there are exceptions. The next sentence opens with “For instance…” which means we’re about to get premises. The argument is saying, “Let me show you instances of the exceptions, in case you don’t believe me.”
Okay, so what are the “instances”? Doctors don’t have to have healthy lifestyles in order to treat people. So that’s an instance. Also, logicians don’t have to be logical in their discussion of logic.
Had the argument simply been presented like that, then where we would question the reasoning would be on the two supposed instances “exceptions.” We could argue whether doctors are an exception to the rule or if they actually fit into the rule. We might argue that, actually, it's important for doctors to practice what they preach for whatever reason. This is what Answer Choice (B) tries to argue. And then we’d try to do the same for logicians. Do they fit the rule or fit the exception?
But the actual argument isn't just "For instance, doctors are an exception and logicians are an exception." The actual argument analogizes logicians to doctors. In so doing, the question of whether either fits the rule or the exception becomes entangled. They are no longer separate analyses.
The actual argument pegs whether logicians must practice what they preach to whether doctors must practice what they preach, as if answering the question for doctors reveals some information that answers the question for logicians. That is the crucial assumption at play.
- Assumption: With regard to whether it's important to practice what you preach, doctors and logicians are analogous.
- Premise: Doctors don’t need to have healthy lifestyles to treat people.
- Sub-conclusion: Logicians don’t have to be logical to discuss logic.
That assumption is fallacious because doctors and logicians are not analogous in that regard. This is what Correct Answer Choice (A) points out. If a doctor doesn’t practice what she preaches, then she can still effectively do her job of being a doctor: treat people. If a logician doesn’t practice what she preaches, then she can no longer do her job of being a logician: logically discuss logic. One can even question to what extent an illogical logician can even be considered a logician. Yet a doctor with an unhealthy lifestyle is no less a doctor. (A) points this out. It says that the argument is weak because it failed to take into account that logicians’ being illogical constitutes incompetence whereas physicians’ having unhealthy lifestyles doesn’t. This is where the two situations are relevantly dissimilar.
Answer Choice (B) says that the argument is weak because it fails to take into account that if a physician’s health deteriorates badly, the physician may not be able to treat patients effectively. This is descriptively accurate but it’s not where the argument is weak. We’ve already discussed how (B) fits into the argument above. (B) offers a reason for a doctor to “practice what she preaches” by pointing out what could happen on the far end of the spectrum. How effectively does this challenge a doctor being an “exception” to the rule? Not that effectively. The argument’s point stands for most cases. In general, a doctor’s having an unhealthy lifestyle does not prevent her from treating people, even though it’s true that if her health deteriorated badly, then she won't be able to treat people anymore. So (B) isn’t very effective in challenging the claim that doctors are an exception.
If we interpreted (B) to address the issue of the disanalogy, that would be even worse for (B). Let’s just assume that doctors aren’t exceptions, that they instead fit better into the rule. That they should also practice what they preach. If we grant this concession, (B) seems to be arguing that logicians also should not be exceptions to the rule either. The questionable aspect of the reasoning or why it feels wrong to us to say that logicians don’t have to be logical, according to (B), is that the argument fails to take into account that doctors actually do have to practice what they preach. See, says (B), doctors have to do it and so logicians should as well. Problem solved. Logicians do have to be logical, after all.
No. That entirely misses the point! The reason why the analogy failed in the first place is because doctors and logicians are essentially disanalogous when it comes to “practice what you preach.” Whether doctors have to or not reveals no information about whether logicians have to or not, because they’re dissimilar in that regard. They’re disanalogous. (A) pointed that out already. (B)’s reasoning still assumes that doctors and logicians are actually analogous; we just got the direction wrong, that doctors actually aren’t exceptions.
Answer Choice (C) says that the argument is weak because it fails to take into account that doctors who are incompetent to practice medicine can cause more harm than can logicians who discuss logic illogically. Okay, (C) tries to point out a difference between doctors and logicians. The problem is that (C) can’t point to just any difference. The difference has to matter. That’s what’s meant by “relevant” dissimilarity (if you’re trying to disanalogize) or “relevant” similarity (if you’re trying to analogize). What counts as “relevant” changes depending on what specifically the argument is talking about. Here, we are talking about why it’s important for logicians to practice what they preach yet not as important for doctors to practice what they preach. What’s “relevant” isn’t the disparate impact that doctors and logicians have on other people, because that doesn’t expose the disanalogy. What exposes the disanalogy is, again, what was already discussed in (A).
Perhaps a different argument will illustrate the point: doctors are required to attend four years of medical school and then complete four years of residency before they are allowed to practice their trade. Therefore, logicians should also be subject to similar educational requirements. This argument by analogy is vulnerable because of what (C) says. The reason why doctors are required to go through eight years of training is because they have the potential to cause great harm. This is a point of relevant dissimilarity between doctors and logicians. This dissimilarity is why the argument’s reasoning by analogy fails.
Answer Choice (D) says that the argument is weak because it fails to take into account that it’s more difficult to become logical than it is to modify an unhealthy lifestyle. Similar to (C), (D) points out a difference but not a relevant difference. The fact that it’s harder to become logical than it is to adopt a healthy lifestyle isn’t why the argument’s reasoning by analogy fails. Even if the two endeavors were equally difficult, the argument’s reasoning by analogy would still fail for the reasons stated in (A).
Answer Choice (E) says that the argument is weak because it fails to take into account that it’s not necessary for logicians to be logical in order to competently discuss logic, though it is highly desirable. No, it is both highly desirable and necessary for logicians to be logical in order to competently discuss logic.
This is a Flaw/Descriptive Weakening question.
The argument takes on a form that we’ve seen plenty before. It says that the Swahili civilization built a particular kind of tomb. Such tombs were widespread among the Oromo civilization and unknown among any other civilization that the Swahili had contacted. From these premises, the argument draws the conclusion that the Swahili were influenced by the Oromo.
Okay, that’s a bold assertion on thin evidence. All we know is that the Oromo also built these tombs. That doesn’t mean that the Swahili imitated the Oromo. It’s certainly possible. But it’s also possible that the Oromo imitated the Swahili. That’s an alternative hypothesis. To discriminate between them, we need more information. Maybe there’s some evidence consistent with one hypothesis but inconsistent with the other. Maybe there’s information about chronology. Who built these tombs first? That’d be a clue about who’s the influencer and who’s the imitator.
Answer Choice (A) says that the argument fails to adequately address the possibility that the Oromo used these structures as something other than tombs. That’s true. But that’s not where the argument is weak. Even if we stipulate that the Oromo used these structures as tombs, the argument still suffers from its causal weaknesses.
Answer Choice (B) says that the argument concludes that the first event caused the second event simply because the first event occurred earlier. If only! Information about the Oromo being first to build these tombs would be really helpful in establishing the conclusion that the Swahili learned from the Oromo. There is no such information so (B) is descriptively inaccurate.
Answer Choice (C) says that the argument draws a restricted conclusion from premises that provide strong support for a much broader conclusion. Uh, come again? (C) thinks this argument could have drawn a broader conclusion? And that the main weakness of the reasoning is that the actual conclusion didn’t go far enough? That’s crazy. The argument has a hard enough time supporting its existing conclusion. It won’t be helped if we swap that conclusion out for an even heavier, more expansive conclusion. I think (C) is picking up on the “to some extent” qualifier in the conclusion. Like, (C) is saying that’s what makes the argument vulnerable, that it should have just come out with a more forceful conclusion. But that misses the point. Toggling the strength of the causal arrow up or down is irrelevant. The problem with this argument is that the causal hypothesis in the conclusion is merely one of many.
Answer Choice (D) says that the argument assumes there was no third civilization responsible for creating the first tombs of the kind found in both the Oromo and Swahili cultures. This is a very attractive trap. It describes a cookie-cutter flaw that we’ve seen so many times in other Flaw questions. The problem is that the argument doesn’t make this assumption. The premises already established that the Swahili had no contact with any other civilization that built such tombs. That precludes the hypothesis that a third civilization was the true creators of these tombs and they were the OG influencers. That couldn’t have happened because the Swahili had no contact with any other civilization that built these tombs except the Oromo. Since this third culture hypothesis is already precluded, the argument doesn’t have to assume anything about whether they first created these tombs. It wouldn’t matter either way. Imagine if it were true that some third culture created the tombs. So what? They’re halfway across the continent and the Swahili didn’t have any contact with them. So if the Swahili learned it from anyone, it would still have to be from the Oromo. (D) is descriptively inaccurate. The argument makes no such assumption because the argument doesn’t have to. The alternative hypothesis that (D) is concerned with was already precluded by the premises.
Correct Answer Choice (E) says that the argument assumes that the Oromo built their tombs earlier than the Swahili did. Yes, that’s definitely an assumption that the argument makes. In order for the Oromo to have influenced the Swahili, the Oromo had to have done it first. If the Swahili got there first, then perhaps it’s the Oromo who were influenced by the Swahili. (E) is descriptively accurate. More than that, (E) is why the argument is weak. There is no information about who got there first. Without that information, we cannot say whether the Oromo as influencer hypothesis or the Swahili as influencer hypothesis is more likely to be true. This is precisely where the argument is most vulnerable to criticism.
This is a Flaw/Descriptive Weakening question.
The argument takes on a form that we’ve seen plenty before. It says that the Swahili civilization built a particular kind of tomb. Such tombs were widespread among the Oromo civilization and unknown among any other civilization that the Swahili had contacted. From these premises, the argument draws the conclusion that the Swahili were influenced by the Oromo.
Okay, that’s a bold assertion on thin evidence. All we know is that the Oromo also built these tombs. That doesn’t mean that the Swahili imitated the Oromo. It’s certainly possible. But it’s also possible that the Oromo imitated the Swahili. That’s an alternative hypothesis. To discriminate between them, we need more information. Maybe there’s some evidence consistent with one hypothesis but inconsistent with the other. Maybe there’s information about chronology. Who built these tombs first? That’d be a clue about who’s the influencer and who’s the imitator.
Answer Choice (A) says that the argument fails to adequately address the possibility that the Oromo used these structures as something other than tombs. That’s true. But that’s not where the argument is weak. Even if we stipulate that the Oromo used these structures as tombs, the argument still suffers from its causal weaknesses.
Answer Choice (B) says that the argument concludes that the first event caused the second event simply because the first event occurred earlier. If only! Information about the Oromo being first to build these tombs would be really helpful in establishing the conclusion that the Swahili learned from the Oromo. There is no such information so (B) is descriptively inaccurate.
Answer Choice (C) says that the argument draws a restricted conclusion from premises that provide strong support for a much broader conclusion. Uh, come again? (C) thinks this argument could have drawn a broader conclusion? And that the main weakness of the reasoning is that the actual conclusion didn’t go far enough? That’s crazy. The argument has a hard enough time supporting its existing conclusion. It won’t be helped if we swap that conclusion out for an even heavier, more expansive conclusion. I think (C) is picking up on the “to some extent” qualifier in the conclusion. Like, (C) is saying that’s what makes the argument vulnerable, that it should have just come out with a more forceful conclusion. But that misses the point. Toggling the strength of the causal arrow up or down is irrelevant. The problem with this argument is that the causal hypothesis in the conclusion is merely one of many.
Answer Choice (D) says that the argument assumes there was no third civilization responsible for creating the first tombs of the kind found in both the Oromo and Swahili cultures. This is a very attractive trap. It describes a cookie-cutter flaw that we’ve seen so many times in other Flaw questions. The problem is that the argument doesn’t make this assumption. The premises already established that the Swahili had no contact with any other civilization that built such tombs. That precludes the hypothesis that a third civilization was the true creators of these tombs and they were the OG influencers. That couldn’t have happened because the Swahili had no contact with any other civilization that built these tombs except the Oromo. Since this third culture hypothesis is already precluded, the argument doesn’t have to assume anything about whether they first created these tombs. It wouldn’t matter either way. Imagine if it were true that some third culture created the tombs. So what? They’re halfway across the continent and the Swahili didn’t have any contact with them. So if the Swahili learned it from anyone, it would still have to be from the Oromo. (D) is descriptively inaccurate. The argument makes no such assumption because the argument doesn’t have to. The alternative hypothesis that (D) is concerned with was already precluded by the premises.
Correct Answer Choice (E) says that the argument assumes that the Oromo built their tombs earlier than the Swahili did. Yes, that’s definitely an assumption that the argument makes. In order for the Oromo to have influenced the Swahili, the Oromo had to have done it first. If the Swahili got there first, then perhaps it’s the Oromo who were influenced by the Swahili. (E) is descriptively accurate. More than that, (E) is why the argument is weak. There is no information about who got there first. Without that information, we cannot say whether the Oromo as influencer hypothesis or the Swahili as influencer hypothesis is more likely to be true. This is precisely where the argument is most vulnerable to criticism.
This is a Flaw/Descriptive Weakening question.
The stimulus starts with other people’s (Smith’s) position (OPP). Smith proposed a new city ordinance prohibiting the use of a sleazy sales tactic. The author then insults Smith’s memory—okay. Then she says that four years ago, Smith owned a business that used the very same sleazy sales tactic. She concludes that Smith’s proposal does not merit consideration.
This is a terrible argument and one that we’ve seen many times before. It’s a source attack. If we want to oppose the ordinance, we should provide premises in support of that position. Attacking the source of the ordinance has no logical effect. It might be rhetorically effective, but that turns on how reasonable the audience is.
In general, source attacks fail. Just imagine how easily Smith can counter the author here. He just has to say something like, “Yeah, no shit. That’s how I know it’s a sleazy sales tactic and that’s why I’m proposing we ban it. I don’t have amnesia but you might have low-level brain damage.”
Correct Answer Choice (A) says the argument dismisses the ordinance because of its source rather than because of its content. This is exactly right.
Answer Choice (B) says the argument takes a single fact that is incompatible with a claim as enough to show that claim to be false. There are at least two issues with (B). First is simply that it’s descriptively inaccurate. The single fact (Smith’s business that used the sleazy sales tactic) is not incompatible with the claim (ban the sleazy sales tactic). That fact may actually be the reason for the claim. Second, even if (B) were descriptively accurate, what (B) describes isn’t inherently a flaw. Whether a single incompatible fact is enough to show a claim to be false depends on what the claim is. If the claim is that all cats are cute, you just have to show me one ugly-ass cat and that claim is dead.
Answer Choice (C) says the argument fails to make a needed distinction between deceptive and legitimate sales tactics. This is almost descriptively accurate. The argument did not make this distinction. But it also did not need to. The reason why the premise doesn’t support the conclusion has nothing to do with failing to define what a legitimate sales tactic looks like.
Answer Choice (D) says the argument draws a conclusion that simply restates a claim presented in support of that conclusion. This is a charge of circular reasoning, of begging the question. This is descriptively inaccurate. The premise is that Smith did something wrong. The conclusion is we should ignore Smith’s proposal to ban that wrong action in the future. These are two very different claims. The argument isn’t circular. Here’s a circular argument: Smith’s proposed city ordinance to prohibit the use of bait-and-switch sales tactics is ill-conceived. Clearly, it is utterly flawed.
Answer Choice (E) says the argument generalizes from a limited number of instances of a certain kind to all instances of that kind. This is an overgeneralization flaw. It’s descriptively inaccurate. Here’s an argument that commits that flaw: Smith’s appliance store uses sleazy sales tactics. Therefore, all of Smith’s businesses use sleazy sales tactics.
This is a Flaw/Descriptive Weakening question.
The stimulus starts with other people’s (Smith’s) position (OPP). Smith proposed a new city ordinance prohibiting the use of a sleazy sales tactic. The author then insults Smith’s memory—okay. Then she says that four years ago, Smith owned a business that used the very same sleazy sales tactic. She concludes that Smith’s proposal does not merit consideration.
This is a terrible argument and one that we’ve seen many times before. It’s a source attack. If we want to oppose the ordinance, we should provide premises in support of that position. Attacking the source of the ordinance has no logical effect. It might be rhetorically effective, but that turns on how reasonable the audience is.
In general, source attacks fail. Just imagine how easily Smith can counter the author here. He just has to say something like, “Yeah, no shit. That’s how I know it’s a sleazy sales tactic and that’s why I’m proposing we ban it. I don’t have amnesia but you might have low-level brain damage.”
Correct Answer Choice (A) says the argument dismisses the ordinance because of its source rather than because of its content. This is exactly right.
Answer Choice (B) says the argument takes a single fact that is incompatible with a claim as enough to show that claim to be false. There are at least two issues with (B). First is simply that it’s descriptively inaccurate. The single fact (Smith’s business that used the sleazy sales tactic) is not incompatible with the claim (ban the sleazy sales tactic). That fact may actually be the reason for the claim. Second, even if (B) were descriptively accurate, what (B) describes isn’t inherently a flaw. Whether a single incompatible fact is enough to show a claim to be false depends on what the claim is. If the claim is that all cats are cute, you just have to show me one ugly-ass cat and that claim is dead.
Answer Choice (C) says the argument fails to make a needed distinction between deceptive and legitimate sales tactics. This is almost descriptively accurate. The argument did not make this distinction. But it also did not need to. The reason why the premise doesn’t support the conclusion has nothing to do with failing to define what a legitimate sales tactic looks like.
Answer Choice (D) says the argument draws a conclusion that simply restates a claim presented in support of that conclusion. This is a charge of circular reasoning, of begging the question. This is descriptively inaccurate. The premise is that Smith did something wrong. The conclusion is we should ignore Smith’s proposal to ban that wrong action in the future. These are two very different claims. The argument isn’t circular. Here’s a circular argument: Smith’s proposed city ordinance to prohibit the use of bait-and-switch sales tactics is ill-conceived. Clearly, it is utterly flawed.
Answer Choice (E) says the argument generalizes from a limited number of instances of a certain kind to all instances of that kind. This is an overgeneralization flaw. It’s descriptively inaccurate. Here’s an argument that commits that flaw: Smith’s appliance store uses sleazy sales tactics. Therefore, all of Smith’s businesses use sleazy sales tactics.
This is a Flaw/Descriptive Weakening question.
The stimulus starts with distinguishing categories of celestial objects. Stars versus planets. Stars generate light. Planets do not generate light, they only reflect it. Next, the argument defines a domain: this galaxy. It says that under this domain (in this galaxy), there are celestial objects that are neither stars nor planets, but it doesn’t give them names. (Fortunately, we already know their names: moons, asteroids, black holes, etc.) The argument then concludes that these nameless objects (i.e., these celestial objects that are neither planets nor stars) generate light.
Wait, what? The premises don’t support the conclusion at all! The premises establish that planets don’t generate light. It also establishes that there are other non-star, non-planet, nameless objects. But it says nothing about whether those nameless objects generate light. Where did that even come from?
As it turns out, Correct Answer Choice (E) reveals that the argument made the oldest mistake in the book: sufficiency-necessity. But this was such an unforced and bizarre error that it very successfully obscured itself. I certainly didn’t see this coming because I never would have expected the argument to confuse “planets don’t generate light (p→/gl)” with “only planets don’t generate light (/gl→p).” Had the premises established that “only planets don’t generate light” and there are non-star and non-planet objects, then those nameless objects would generate light. But the argument in fact only established that “planets don’t generate light.” It failed to consider the possibility that planets are not the only celestial objects that don’t generate light. For example, moons and asteroids also don’t generate light.
Answer Choice (A) says the argument failed to consider the possibility that this galaxy contains no celestial objects that reflect light other than planets. This is such an irrelevant consideration that I guess the argument failed to consider it. But that’s not why the argument’s reasoning is flawed. The conclusion is claiming that the nameless objects generate light. (A) is concerned with whether these nameless objects reflect light. Who cares if they reflect light or not?
Answer Choice (B) says the argument failed to consider the possibility that celestial objects in this galaxy comprise only a minute percentage of all the celestial objects in the universe. Similar to (A), this is such an irrelevant consideration that I guess the argument failed to consider it. But that’s not why the argument’s reasoning is flawed. The argument already established its domain: this galaxy. The conclusion does not exceed the bounds of that domain.
Answer Choice (C) says the argument failed to consider the possibility that celestial objects in this galaxy are not the only celestial objects that generate light. Similar to (A) and (B), this is such an irrelevant consideration that I guess the argument failed to consider it. But that’s not why the argument’s reasoning is flawed. (B) claims that there may be celestial objects in other galaxies that generate light. Okay, but who cares? The argument already established its domain: this galaxy. The conclusion does not exceed the bounds of that domain.
Answer Choice (D) says the argument failed to consider the possibility that there are numerous features that distinguish stars from planets besides the ability to generate light. Similar to (A), (B), and (C), this is such an irrelevant consideration that I guess the argument failed to consider it. But that’s not why the argument’s reasoning is flawed. It doesn’t matter what other features distinguish planets from stars. Stars tend to be bigger. Stars tend to live longer. Great. Who cares?
This is a Flaw/Descriptive Weakening question.
The stimulus starts with distinguishing categories of celestial objects. Stars versus planets. Stars generate light. Planets do not generate light, they only reflect it. Next, the argument defines a domain: this galaxy. It says that under this domain (in this galaxy), there are celestial objects that are neither stars nor planets, but it doesn’t give them names. (Fortunately, we already know their names: moons, asteroids, black holes, etc.) The argument then concludes that these nameless objects (i.e., these celestial objects that are neither planets nor stars) generate light.
Wait, what? The premises don’t support the conclusion at all! The premises establish that planets don’t generate light. It also establishes that there are other non-star, non-planet, nameless objects. But it says nothing about whether those nameless objects generate light. Where did that even come from?
As it turns out, Correct Answer Choice (E) reveals that the argument made the oldest mistake in the book: sufficiency-necessity. But this was such an unforced and bizarre error that it very successfully obscured itself. I certainly didn’t see this coming because I never would have expected the argument to confuse “planets don’t generate light (p→/gl)” with “only planets don’t generate light (/gl→p).” Had the premises established that “only planets don’t generate light” and there are non-star and non-planet objects, then those nameless objects would generate light. But the argument in fact only established that “planets don’t generate light.” It failed to consider the possibility that planets are not the only celestial objects that don’t generate light. For example, moons and asteroids also don’t generate light.
Answer Choice (A) says the argument failed to consider the possibility that this galaxy contains no celestial objects that reflect light other than planets. This is such an irrelevant consideration that I guess the argument failed to consider it. But that’s not why the argument’s reasoning is flawed. The conclusion is claiming that the nameless objects generate light. (A) is concerned with whether these nameless objects reflect light. Who cares if they reflect light or not?
Answer Choice (B) says the argument failed to consider the possibility that celestial objects in this galaxy comprise only a minute percentage of all the celestial objects in the universe. Similar to (A), this is such an irrelevant consideration that I guess the argument failed to consider it. But that’s not why the argument’s reasoning is flawed. The argument already established its domain: this galaxy. The conclusion does not exceed the bounds of that domain.
Answer Choice (C) says the argument failed to consider the possibility that celestial objects in this galaxy are not the only celestial objects that generate light. Similar to (A) and (B), this is such an irrelevant consideration that I guess the argument failed to consider it. But that’s not why the argument’s reasoning is flawed. (B) claims that there may be celestial objects in other galaxies that generate light. Okay, but who cares? The argument already established its domain: this galaxy. The conclusion does not exceed the bounds of that domain.
Answer Choice (D) says the argument failed to consider the possibility that there are numerous features that distinguish stars from planets besides the ability to generate light. Similar to (A), (B), and (C), this is such an irrelevant consideration that I guess the argument failed to consider it. But that’s not why the argument’s reasoning is flawed. It doesn’t matter what other features distinguish planets from stars. Stars tend to be bigger. Stars tend to live longer. Great. Who cares?
This is a Flaw/Descriptive Weakening question.
This is a causal argument with phenomenon-premises and a hypothesis-conclusion. The first premise reveals that for physical therapy patients that received less than six weeks of treatment, around a third showed major improvement. This result was the same regardless of whether the treatment was by a generalist or specialist. The second premise reveals a similar phenomenon for longer treatment. This time, around half showed major improvement. Again, the result was the same regardless of whether the treatment was by a generalist or specialist.
So those are all the facts we have. That’s collectively the “phenomenon.” What causal conclusion can be drawn? Well, not much. Certainly not the conclusion actually drawn: the choice between a generalist and specialist makes no difference.
Let’s say you wanted to test this hypothesis. You think that the choice between a generalist and specialist makes no difference. How would you go about designing your (ideal) experiment? I put “ideal” in parentheses because it really doesn’t have to be ideal. It just has to be better than the data in the stimulus and that’s a low bar. So, you’d collect a ton of people prescribed less than six weeks of physical therapy. Then you’d randomly assign them to specialists and generalists. Then you wait out the six weeks and you measure to see what percentage in each group experienced major improvement. If it turns out that about a third experienced major improvement in either group, then that’s good evidence that the choice between generalist and specialist has no causal power. (And then you do it all over again for the long-term treatment.) But notice how different that is from what actually happened in the stimulus. The stimulus presented observational data, not experimental data. That means there were no controls. Specifically, there were no controls for self-selection. The assignment to generalist or specialist was not random. People chose whether to see a generalist or a specialist and presumably with good reason! What reason? Maybe because generalists and specialists are better suited to treat different kinds of injuries.
This is exactly what Correct Answer Choice (E) points out. This argument is vulnerable because it overlooked the possibility that generalists and specialists each excel at treating a different type of injury. (E) is subtle in exposing the flawed logic of the argument. I’m pretty blunt so let me shine a spotlight on this error with the following argument.
Records reveal that of patients who received heart surgery, about 75% regained full cardiovascular functions one month post operation regardless of whether they received a double bypass or a quadruple bypass surgery. Therefore the choice of a double or quadruple bypass will not affect one’s chances of regaining full cardiovascular function.
Is the flaw glaring now? Imagine telling the patient who’s scheduled for a quadruple bypass that actually, you know what, you don’t need four unclogged arteries, let’s just clear up two of them and you’ll be fine.
Answer Choice (D) is very attractive. It claims that the reasoning is vulnerable because the argument failed to indicate whether the number of patients surveyed who saw a generalist was equivalent to the number who saw a specialist. While (D) is descriptively accurate, the argument’s failure to indicate isn’t where the argument is weak. To see this, imagine if we supplied an additional premise that fixed this “problem” by indicating what (D) wants. So the same argument, but now an additional premise indicates that the numbers were equal. Voila, the conclusion follows! Just kidding. The argument is still garbage for all the reasons discussed above.
If (D) was attractive to you, perhaps you thought that experiments require equal group sizes? First, note that (D) isn’t talking about an experiment (because the stimulus isn’t an experiment). Second, it’s not true that equal sizes are a requirement for experiments. It’s nice to have (for statistical reasons) but it’s not necessary. I think you can intuitively understand this just by imagining an experiment where one group was slightly larger than the other, say 60/40. Your results will still be fine as long as you avoid the other experimental pitfalls (random assignment, blinding, etc.).
Answer Choice (A) is also attractive though for a different reason. (A) is attractive mainly because it’s gibberish but fancy-sounding gibberish. It claims that the argument is vulnerable because it assumes (without warrant) that if the effectiveness of different practitioners in bringing about any (which includes minor) improvement does not differ, then their effectiveness in bringing about major improvement cannot differ. What? No, the argument makes no such assumption. The argument does not assume there is no difference in how effective generalists and specialists are with respect to bringing about minor improvements.
Answer Choice (B) claims that the argument provides no information about the kinds of injuries that require short-term versus long-term treatment. Okay, this is descriptively accurate but nobody cares because this isn’t why the argument is weak. I think (B) could have been right had the argument been edited just a little. Like this: Records reveal that regardless of whether patients receive short-term (six weeks) or long-term treatment, about 50% experience major improvements within six weeks. Therefore, the choice between short- or long-term will not affect one’s chances of major improvement. This argument is weak because it assumed that the assignment was random whereas it almost certainly was not. It almost certainly was the case that there was self-selection determining who got short-term and who got long-term. And that’s because doctors diagnose and prescribe proportional treatment. One way to describe this weakness is to say that the argument should have provided information about the kinds of injuries that require short-term as opposed to long-term treatment. That information would have most likely revealed that it’s the more severe injuries that require long-term treatment.
Answer Choice (C) claims that the argument overlooks the possibility that patients are more strongly biased to report favorably on one of the two types of medical professionals than on the other. (C) thinks the weakness in the argument has to do with whether the “one third” and “one half” major improvement results are believable. This kind of objection, the “wait, but are you sure your data maps onto reality?” is more powerful in arguments that rely on survey results. It’s not clear this is such an argument. The premises say, “records reveal.” What kind of records? How was the data collected? Did we ask the patients if they showed major improvement? Or did we simply measure their physical abilities to determine major improvement? If the latter, then (C) completely misses the mark for it assumes the data came from subjective reports. If we patch this issue up, then (C) at best identifies a minor issue in the argument. While it’s true that the argument does assume that these records reflect reality, the argument also failed to account for self-selection. That second issue is the major one because if that were fixed, the argument would improve dramatically whereas if we fixed the “records reflect reality” issue, the argument would still be flawed.
A
presumes, without providing justification, that effectiveness of different practitioners in bringing about major improvement cannot differ at all if their effectiveness in bringing about any improvement does not differ
B
provides no information about the kinds of injuries that require short-term as opposed to long-term treatment
C
overlooks the possibility that patients are more strongly biased to report favorably on one of the two types of medical professionals than on the other
D
fails to indicate whether the number of patients surveyed who saw a general practitioner was equal to the number who saw a specialist
E
overlooks the possibility that specialists and general practitioners each tend to excel at treating a different type of injury
This is a Flaw/Descriptive Weakening question.
This is a causal argument with phenomenon-premises and a hypothesis-conclusion. The first premise reveals that for physical therapy patients that received less than six weeks of treatment, around a third showed major improvement. This result was the same regardless of whether the treatment was by a generalist or specialist. The second premise reveals a similar phenomenon for longer treatment. This time, around half showed major improvement. Again, the result was the same regardless of whether the treatment was by a generalist or specialist.
So those are all the facts we have. That’s collectively the “phenomenon.” What causal conclusion can be drawn? Well, not much. Certainly not the conclusion actually drawn: the choice between a generalist and specialist makes no difference.
Let’s say you wanted to test this hypothesis. You think that the choice between a generalist and specialist makes no difference. How would you go about designing your (ideal) experiment? I put “ideal” in parentheses because it really doesn’t have to be ideal. It just has to be better than the data in the stimulus and that’s a low bar. So, you’d collect a ton of people prescribed less than six weeks of physical therapy. Then you’d randomly assign them to specialists and generalists. Then you wait out the six weeks and you measure to see what percentage in each group experienced major improvement. If it turns out that about a third experienced major improvement in either group, then that’s good evidence that the choice between generalist and specialist has no causal power. (And then you do it all over again for the long-term treatment.) But notice how different that is from what actually happened in the stimulus. The stimulus presented observational data, not experimental data. That means there were no controls. Specifically, there were no controls for self-selection. The assignment to generalist or specialist was not random. People chose whether to see a generalist or a specialist and presumably with good reason! What reason? Maybe because generalists and specialists are better suited to treat different kinds of injuries.
This is exactly what Correct Answer Choice (E) points out. This argument is vulnerable because it overlooked the possibility that generalists and specialists each excel at treating a different type of injury. (E) is subtle in exposing the flawed logic of the argument. I’m pretty blunt so let me shine a spotlight on this error with the following argument.
Records reveal that of patients who received heart surgery, about 75% regained full cardiovascular functions one month post operation regardless of whether they received a double bypass or a quadruple bypass surgery. Therefore the choice of a double or quadruple bypass will not affect one’s chances of regaining full cardiovascular function.
Is the flaw glaring now? Imagine telling the patient who’s scheduled for a quadruple bypass that actually, you know what, you don’t need four unclogged arteries, let’s just clear up two of them and you’ll be fine.
Answer Choice (D) is very attractive. It claims that the reasoning is vulnerable because the argument failed to indicate whether the number of patients surveyed who saw a generalist was equivalent to the number who saw a specialist. While (D) is descriptively accurate, the argument’s failure to indicate isn’t where the argument is weak. To see this, imagine if we supplied an additional premise that fixed this “problem” by indicating what (D) wants. So the same argument, but now an additional premise indicates that the numbers were equal. Voila, the conclusion follows! Just kidding. The argument is still garbage for all the reasons discussed above.
If (D) was attractive to you, perhaps you thought that experiments require equal group sizes? First, note that (D) isn’t talking about an experiment (because the stimulus isn’t an experiment). Second, it’s not true that equal sizes are a requirement for experiments. It’s nice to have (for statistical reasons) but it’s not necessary. I think you can intuitively understand this just by imagining an experiment where one group was slightly larger than the other, say 60/40. Your results will still be fine as long as you avoid the other experimental pitfalls (random assignment, blinding, etc.).
Answer Choice (A) is also attractive though for a different reason. (A) is attractive mainly because it’s gibberish but fancy-sounding gibberish. It claims that the argument is vulnerable because it assumes (without warrant) that if the effectiveness of different practitioners in bringing about any (which includes minor) improvement does not differ, then their effectiveness in bringing about major improvement cannot differ. What? No, the argument makes no such assumption. The argument does not assume there is no difference in how effective generalists and specialists are with respect to bringing about minor improvements.
Answer Choice (B) claims that the argument provides no information about the kinds of injuries that require short-term versus long-term treatment. Okay, this is descriptively accurate but nobody cares because this isn’t why the argument is weak. I think (B) could have been right had the argument been edited just a little. Like this: Records reveal that regardless of whether patients receive short-term (six weeks) or long-term treatment, about 50% experience major improvements within six weeks. Therefore, the choice between short- or long-term will not affect one’s chances of major improvement. This argument is weak because it assumed that the assignment was random whereas it almost certainly was not. It almost certainly was the case that there was self-selection determining who got short-term and who got long-term. And that’s because doctors diagnose and prescribe proportional treatment. One way to describe this weakness is to say that the argument should have provided information about the kinds of injuries that require short-term as opposed to long-term treatment. That information would have most likely revealed that it’s the more severe injuries that require long-term treatment.
Answer Choice (C) claims that the argument overlooks the possibility that patients are more strongly biased to report favorably on one of the two types of medical professionals than on the other. (C) thinks the weakness in the argument has to do with whether the “one third” and “one half” major improvement results are believable. This kind of objection, the “wait, but are you sure your data maps onto reality?” is more powerful in arguments that rely on survey results. It’s not clear this is such an argument. The premises say, “records reveal.” What kind of records? How was the data collected? Did we ask the patients if they showed major improvement? Or did we simply measure their physical abilities to determine major improvement? If the latter, then (C) completely misses the mark for it assumes the data came from subjective reports. If we patch this issue up, then (C) at best identifies a minor issue in the argument. While it’s true that the argument does assume that these records reflect reality, the argument also failed to account for self-selection. That second issue is the major one because if that were fixed, the argument would improve dramatically whereas if we fixed the “records reflect reality” issue, the argument would still be flawed.