Summary
Philosophical paradoxes are particularly baffling arguments. On one hand your intuitions tell you the conclusion of the paradox is false, but on the other hand they also tell you that its conclusion follows logically from true premises. Solving a philosophical paradox requires accepting any one of three things: that its conclusion is true, that at least one of its premises is not true, or that its conclusion does not really follow logically from its premises.
Notable Valid Inferences
Solving a philosophical paradox requires denying one or the other of your intuitions.
A
Solving a philosophical paradox requires accepting something that intuitively seems to be incorrect.
Must be true. The stimulus tells us that solving a paradox requires accepting one of three things. Accepting any of these three things contradicts either sense of intuition described in the second sentence.
B
The conclusion of a philosophical paradox cannot be false if all the paradox’s premises are true.
Could be false. The stimulus tells us that one of the three things we could accept when solving a paradox is that its conclusion does not really follow logically from its premises.
C
Philosophical paradoxes with one or two premises are more baffling than those with several premises.
Could be false. We don’t have any information in the stimulus that tells us which types of paradoxes are more baffling than others. The stimulus introduces philosophical paradoxes as baffling in a matter-of-fact way, not in a comparative way.
D
Any two people who attempt to solve a philosophical paradox will probably use two different approaches.
Could be false. We don’t have any information in the stimulus about people who attempt to solve these paradoxes. It is possible that two people could use identical approaches.
E
If it is not possible to accept that the conclusion of a particular philosophical paradox is true, then it is not possible to solve that paradox.
Could be false. The stimulus gives us three options to accept in order to solve a philosophical paradox. It is possible for a person to solve a paradox by accepting either of the other two options instead.
Summary
Some people prefer to avoid facing unpleasant truths. These people resent those who force them into a confrontation with unwanted honesty. Other people dislike having any information withheld from them, including painful information.
Strongly Supported Conclusions
If people who prefer to avoid facing unpleasant truths are guided by the directive to treat others how they would want to be treated, they would withhold painful information from those who want all information given to them.
A
they will sometimes withhold comment in situations in which they would otherwise be willing to speak
This is unsupported because we don’t know in which situations members of the former group would usually be willing to speak.
B
they will sometimes treat those in the latter group in a manner the members of this latter group do not like
This is strongly supported because those in the former group, who wish to have painful information withheld, would do the same and withhold painful information from the latter group. The latter group does not like having any information withheld.
C
those in the latter group must be guided by an entirely different principle of behavior
This is unsupported because we don’t know what principles of behavior guide those in the latter group.
D
those in the latter group will respond by concealing unpleasant truths
This is unsupported because we don’t know that the latter group would reciprocate if the former group started withholding painful truths.
E
the result will meet with the approval of both groups
This is anti-supported because if the former group treated the latter how the former would want to be treated, then the former group would withhold painful information to the dismay of the latter group.
Summarize Argument: Phenomenon-Hypothesis
The advocate argues that taking cold medicine is counterproductive. She supports this claim by citing a study wherein people who took cold medicine reported more severe symptoms than did those who didn’t take cold medicine.
Identify and Describe Flaw
This is a “correlation doesn’t imply causation” flaw, where the advocate sees a correlation and concludes that one thing caused the other without ruling out alternative hypotheses. Specifically, she overlooks two key alternatives:
(1) The causal relationship could be reversed—maybe people with more severe symptoms are more likely to take cold medicine!
(2) Some other factor could be causing the correlation—for example, maybe in parts of the world where colds tend to be more severe, cold medicine also happens to be more widely available.
(1) The causal relationship could be reversed—maybe people with more severe symptoms are more likely to take cold medicine!
(2) Some other factor could be causing the correlation—for example, maybe in parts of the world where colds tend to be more severe, cold medicine also happens to be more widely available.
A
treats something as true simply because most people believe it to be true
The advocate’s premise is a study, not a general belief. Furthermore, we have no reason to think that most people believe her conclusion or her premise to be true.
B
treats some people as experts in an area in which there is no reason to take them to be reliable sources of information
The advocate doesn’t arbitrarily treat anyone as an expert. Rather, she cites the results of a study wherein people reported on their own symptoms—a subject in which people do have some expertise!
C
takes something to be true in one case just because it is true in most cases
The advocate’s conclusion is extremely general; she does not mention any specific cases.
D
rests on a confusion between what is required for a particular outcome and what is sufficient to cause that outcome
The advocate’s argument doesn’t mistake sufficiency for necessity. She doesn’t claim in either the premise or the conclusion that cold medicine is sufficient or necessary to cause severe cold symptoms.
E
confuses what is likely the cause of something for an effect of that thing
This is the cookie-cutter flaw of confusing correlation and causation. The advocate’s argument forgets that the causal relationship could be reversed—maybe people with more severe symptoms are more likely to take cold medicine!