Ethicist: A person who treats others well is more worthy of praise if this treatment is at least partially motivated by feelings of compassion than if it is entirely motivated by cold and dispassionate concern for moral obligation. This is so despite the fact that a person can choose to do what is morally right but cannot choose to have feelings.

Summary

Who is more worthy of praise? A person who treats others well partially out of feelings of compassion, or a person who treats others well entirely out of of moral obligation? The person motivated by feelings is more worthy of praise.

People can choose to do what is morally right.

People cannot choose to have feelings.

Notable Valid Inferences

People can be more worthy of praise even when they are motivated by something they cannot control than when they are motivated by something that they can control.

A
Only actions that are at least partially the result of a person’s feelings should be used in measuring the praiseworthiness of that person.

Could be true. The author believes a person motivated by compassion is more worthy of praise. So he could believe that only actions resulting from feelings should be used in determining praiseworthiness.

B
If a person feels compassion toward the people affected by that person’s actions, yet these actions diminish the welfare of those people, that person does not deserve praise.

Could be true. The stimulus only tells us about who is more or less deserving of praise. This is a relative relationship. We do not know who does or does not deserve praise.

C
Only what is subject to a person’s choice should be used in measuring the praiseworthiness of that person.

Must be false. We know a person who’s motivated by feelings, which we can’t control, is more worthy of praise than a person who’s motivated by obligation, which we can control. So the author disagrees with the idea that praiseworthiness depends only on stuff we can choose.

D
Someone who acts without feelings of compassion toward those affected by the actions is worthy of praise if those actions enhance the welfare of the people affected.

Could be true. The stimulus only tells us about who is more or less deserving of praise. This is a relative relationship. We do not know who is or is not worthy of praise.

E
If someone wants to have compassion toward others but does not, that person is worthy of praise.

Could be true. The stimulus only tells us about who is more or less deserving of praise. This is a relative relationship. We do not know who is or is not worthy of praise.


6 comments

Mario: The field of cognitive science is not a genuinely autonomous discipline since it addresses issues also addressed by the disciplines of computer science, linguistics, and psychology. A genuinely autonomous discipline has a domain of inquiry all its own.

Lucy: Nonsense. You’ve always acknowledged that philosophy is a genuinely autonomous discipline and that, like most people, you think of philosophy as addressing issues also addressed by the disciplines of linguistics, mathematics, and psychology. A field of study is a genuinely autonomous discipline by virtue of its having a unique methodology rather than by virtue of its addressing issues that no other field of study addresses.

Summarize Argument: Counter-Position
Lucy denies Mario’s claim that a genuinely autonomous discipline has its own domain inquiry and instead concludes a field is autonomous by virtue of having its own methodology. As evidence, she points out that in the past Mario has acknowledged philosophy as a genuinely autonomous discipline despite also thinking philosophy addresses issues also addressed by linguistics, mathematics, and psychology.

Describe Method of Reasoning
Lucy counters the position held by Mario. She does this by pointing out that Mario has demonstrated beliefs in the past that directly contradict the principle he asserts. If Mario has believed philosophy is a genuinely autonomous discipline, then it’s not supported that a genuinely autonomous discipline must have a unique domain inquiry.

A
questioning Mario’s expertise in cognitive science
Lucy does not address Mario’s credentials or expertise. She only addresses the inconsistencies between Mario’s beliefs.
B
demonstrating that Mario confuses the notion of a field of study with that of a genuinely autonomous discipline
Lucy’s claims demonstrate that Mario has an incorrect definition of what it means for a discipline to be genuinely autonomous. This is different from confusing a genuinely autonomous discipline with a field of study.
C
showing that some of Mario’s beliefs are not compatible with the principle on which he bases his conclusion
The belief Mario holds is the belief that philosophy is a genuinely autonomous discipline. This belief contradicts Mario’s principle that a genuinely autonomous discipline must have a unique domain inquiry, because philosophy addresses issues also addressed by other disciplines.
D
disputing the accuracy of Mario’s description of cognitive science as addressing issues also addressed by other disciplines
Lucy does not address the topic of cognitive science specifically.
E
establishing that Mario is not a philosopher
Lucy does not address Mario’s status as a philosopher. We cannot assume this just because Lucy establishes that Mario holds inconsistent beliefs about philosophy.

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Researchers have developed a membrane that quickly removes the oxygen from a refrigerator, thereby killing bacteria and enabling food to be stored almost indefinitely. Since food need not be kept as cold to prevent spoilage, energy costs will be greatly reduced. Thus, over the long run, oxygen-removing refrigerators will prove far less expensive than current models.

A
address the expense of building or refitting a refrigerator with the new technology
This is a key possibility that the argument ignores. If these expenses outweigh the money saved from keeping the food in the oxygen-removing refrigerators at a warmer temperature, the oxygen-removing models may not be significantly cheaper than current models in the long term.
B
address the possibility of consumer discomfort with the new refrigerators
Consumer discomfort with the new refrigerators is irrelevant. The argument is only concerned with how much cheaper the new refrigerators could potentially be than current models.
C
explain the technology that enabled the oxygen-removing membrane to be developed
The technology doesn’t need to be explained. The author is just making the case that refrigerators fitted with this technology will be cheaper, in the long run, than current refrigerator models.
D
take into account the effectiveness of current refrigerator technology in preventing food spoilage
It’s not clear that the author doesn’t take this into account, but even if he doesn’t, the effectiveness of current refrigerator technology in preventing food spoilage has no bearing on whether oxygen-removing models will be cheaper in the long term.
E
take into account the inconvenience caused by food spoilage in current refrigerators
It’s not clear that the author doesn’t take this into account, but even if he doesn’t, the inconvenience caused by food spoilage in current refrigerators has no bearing on whether oxygen-removing models will be cheaper in the long term.

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